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“The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has devoted considerable resources to analyzing the labor
scene in China, including China’s labor-related legislation, practice, and institutions. The Solidarity Center’s 
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human rights are respected in China. Its scope, wealth of references, details, and examples make it an indispensa-
ble instrument for trade unionists who seek a credible source of information on this global giant. It will also be 
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most populated country and fastest growing economy.”
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selves without jobs or pensions as state enterprises close in the ‘rust belt’ of northeastern China. This report
takes a measured and detailed look at the problem.”
James Mann
Author, Beijing Jeep and About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship
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F O R E W O R D
n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n
In this report from the Solidarity Center series Justice for All: The Struggle for WorkerRights, a team of researchers and experts led by Cornell University’s Lance Compa
examines the status of worker rights in China—the global giant whose nearly 800 million
workers represent one-fourth of the world’s labor force. Justice for All: The Struggle for
Worker Rights in China holds China’s labor law and practice up to international standards
enshrined in International Labor Organization conventions and the ILO’s 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
Today, China is changing. Its closed
culture is opening up, and its people
are experiencing new choices and
new opportunities. As Justice for All
notes, wealth in China has expanded
enormously. But wealth for whom? 
In the vital area of human rights,
China has changed little. China has
pursued a development strategy that
denies its workers the most basic
freedoms. Capitalism is flourishing
under a political dictatorship that
competes by offering investors disci-
plined and exploited labor. The
marketization of China’s economy
has even pitted Chinese workers
against one another—state-owned
enterprise workers against their
private sector counterparts and
migrant workers against those who
were born in the cities.
China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization and its emergence as
the country of choice for manufac-
turing have profoundly altered the
world economic order and the
workers who build it. China’s low
wages, skilled workforce, diverse
manufacturing base, and vast internal
market are powerful incentives for
companies throughout the world to
relocate production. “Made in
China” is now a prominent emblem
on items as varied as manhole covers,
computer chips, airframe compo-
nents, children’s clothing and toys,
and heavy construction equipment.
By John J. Sweeney
President, AFL-CIO
Foreword
3
China also consumes investment
flows, because investors believe that
it will offer higher rates of return
than other countries. In 2005, the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement will end
textile and garment trade quotas.
Economists project that the ensuing
massive shift to China of millions of
garment/textile manufacturing jobs
will have an enormous impact on
smaller developing countries, such as
Bangladesh, Cambodia, El Salvador,
and Mauritius.
We believe that resolving the chal-
lenge of China is key to building a
new consensus about globalization.
For the international trade union
movement, respect for fundamental
worker rights is a moral and demo-
cratic imperative as well as an essen-
tial path to development and global
prosperity. If workers in China
cannot gain their basic rights and 
a fair share of the profits and pro-
ductivity they help generate, human
rights abuses and inequality will
continue to grow around the world.
And if China, as a new global manu-
facturing center, rejects freedom of
association, other developing coun-
tries will be pressured to follow suit.
As Justice for All notes, whatever
course international economic and
political relations may take in the
twenty-first century, China will be a
major regional and global power.
The question is: Will China’s power
be a force for advancing democracy,
human rights, and economic and
social development at home, in the
region, and in the world, or will
China turn its back on this historic
opportunity? If China chooses to
pursue a vision of social and eco-
nomic justice, the AFL-CIO stands
ready to work with China’s leaders
and worker representatives to build 
a world in which all people prosper.
Chinese workers, American workers,
and workers throughout the world
deserve no less.
n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  
For the international trade union movement, respect for 
fundamental worker rights is a moral and democratic imperative
as well as an essential path to development and global prosperity.
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China is one of the world’sgreat civilizations. Its hugeland mass has thousands of
miles of ocean coastlines and contains
enormous and diverse natural re-
sources. With more than 1.3 billion
people living in China’s 23 provinces,
five autonomous regions, and four
quasi-regional municipalities, China
is the most populous country in 
the world.
The Chinese people share one of 
the world’s oldest continuous civi-
lizations, with a written history of
close to 4,000 years that comprises
the rise and fall of more than 20
dynasties and periods. For many
centuries, China was a center of
scientific, cultural, legal, and intel-
lectual progress. It was the Chinese
who invented paper, printing, and
gunpowder.
China’s workers rose to organize
themselves for workplace improve-
ments and democratic reform as far
back as the Song Dynasty (420-478
A.D.), when craft workers formed
their own guilds. Modern industries,
such as coal mining and machinery,
began in the 1870s with imported
technology and gave rise to an indus-
trial working class. Where industrial
development was heavy, as in prov-
inces like Hubei and Hebei and cities
like Shanghai and Tianjin, tradi-
tional guilds emerged with functions
similar to those of trade unions.
During the nineteenth century, the
industrialized nations of the West
and Japan sought to “open China”
to trade. In the 1840s, Britain fought
the “Opium Wars” to force China 
to permit imports of opium and
other goods. Britain and other
Western countries used military
power (“gunboat diplomacy”) to
compel China to sign so-called
“unequal treaties” granting Western
nations territorial privileges and other
rights. The Chinese viewed this as 
an attempt by the “Great Powers”
to divide China among themselves
and to enslave the Chinese people.1
Labor in the Twentieth Century
After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in
1911, the republican revolutionaries
of Sun Yat-sen failed to establish a
central government, and regional
military forces controlled by warlords
rose and divided China. The suppres-
sion of these warlords and the unifi-
cation of China became the main
tasks of the early Republican govern-
ment under Sun Yat-sen, who
founded the Kuomintang (KMT), or
Nationalist Party.
In the early years of the twentieth
century, China was overwhelmingly
poverty-stricken, and conditions for
Chinese workers were difficult.
Migrating workers sought industrial
jobs, where they encountered low
wages, long hours, desolate lodging,
and, usually, no medical care or
insurance. Child labor was common.
C H A P T E R  1
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improvements and democratic reform as far back as the Song
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In this climate, industrial disputes
occurred frequently—more than 
170 strikes between 1919 and 1921
alone. In 1914, the Shanghai customs
workers organized the first conven-
tional trade union in China’s recorded
history. In 1919, workers in many
cities of China struck in support of
the May Fourth movement, which
was directed against the Versailles
peace conference decision to turn over
to Japan the former German conces-
sions in China.
In China, as in most countries
during that period, a Marxist
response to industrialization and
capitalism emerged that led to the
founding of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in 1921. CCP organ-
izers, including Liu Shaoqi and Mao
Zedong, built trade unions in the
cities and organized millions in the
south into peasant organizations,
generating the movement that
proved to be the social base of the
CCP and the Chinese revolution.
As many as 60,000 workers staged
work stoppages or sympathy strikes
in Shanghai alone. The Canton-
Hong Kong General Strike of 1925-
1926, called to protest the shooting
of Chinese demonstrators by British
colonial forces in Shanghai, helped
lead to the formation of the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) in 1925, in which both
the CCP and the KMT played 
an important role. Initially, many
CCP members held dual member-
ship in the KMT as part of the
“united front” policy advocated 
by the Comintern (Communist
International, the international
communist organization founded 
by Lenin in 1919). In the late 1920s
the ACFTU claimed to represent
some 2.8 million workers.2
In 1925, the nationalist general
Chiang Kai-shek became leader of
the KMT, which at that time was
based in southern China. Chiang
initially cooperated with the CCP in
1926 in organizing the “Northern
C
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Expedition” to extend the area
controlled by the KMT and to elim-
inate the warlords. Although the
Northern Expedition campaign 
won many battles, the most powerful
warlords, such as Zhang Xueliang 
in the Northeast, retained regional
sway. The KMT government negoti-
ated with the strongest warlords,
winning their recognition of the
central government in Nanjing in
exchange for allowing them to keep
their own armed forces and giving
them high positions in the Nanjing
government. Zhang Xueliang, for
example, was appointed vice com-
mander-in-chief of the military after
he openly supported Chiang’s effort
to unify the country. The KMT was
the official ruling party from 1927 to
1949. However, unity became elusive,
as the initial collaboration between
the KMT and the CCP began to
unravel, and tensions between the
parties continued to grow.
In February 1927, Shanghai labor
leaders called a general strike in
support of the Northern Expedition.
The strike brought Shanghai to a
standstill for two days. Although the
warlords and colonial forces in the
foreign settlement areas eventually
broke the strike, worker morale was
strong, and a second strike was
launched in March as the Nationalist
Revolutionary Army entered Shang-
hai.3 In April, the KMT broke its
united front with the CCP and
attacked the CCP-led strikers. After
the Shanghai strike was suppressed,
the CCP launched “insurrections” in
Canton and Changsha. These were
quickly defeated, forcing the CCP
and its sympathizers to flee the
urban centers and retreat to isolated
rural mountain strongholds in the
Hunan-Jiangxi border region.
Efforts to build an urban labor move-
ment faltered under Nationalist rule
for about 20 years. Communist 
labor organizers captured in KMT-
controlled cities were imprisoned 
or executed. The KMT made some
attempts to educate the peasantry,
provide public health service, encour-
age scientific improvements, and
build roads and lines for telecommu-
nications. It even passed some worker
rights legislation. However, these
efforts failed to bring widespread
prosperity or stability. The country-
side was ruled by corrupt landed
gentry who opposed any real reform,
and the KMT could not or would
not challenge them.
The Japanese invaded in 1931,
took the Northeast (then called
Manchuria), and set up a puppet
government. At that time, the CCP
controlled a very small area in
southern China, and the KMT was
occupied with its efforts to suppress
the “communist bandits.” The CCP
escaped from the KMT encirclement
and, from 1934 to 1936, undertook
the “Long March” from southern
China to the northern Shaanxi
Province. There the CCP set up a
base at Yenan and called on the
KMT to join in a campaign to resist
the Japanese. In 1936, former
warlord Zhang Xueliang, whose
military forces had been driven out
by the Japanese from Manchuria 
in 1931 and who was frustrated 
with Chiang’s failure to prevent 
the loss of Manchuria, took Chiang
hostage in the “Xi’an Incident” and
forced him to accept a truce with the
CCP in order to fight the Japanese.
During the bitter eight-year war
with the Japanese, beginning in
1937, the KMT undertook little
further reform.
The need for change, heightened by
the tensions between urban and
rural China, served to strengthen the
CCP as the KMT became increas-
ingly corrupt. In 1945, an economic
crisis caused inflation so severe that
thousands of industrial workers went
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the war. In 1946, more than 1,700
strikes and other labor disputes
occurred in Shanghai alone.4
Communists in Power
At the end of World War II, the
growing tensions between the CCP
and the KMT erupted into a civil
war for control of China. In 1949,
supported by peasants and urban
workers, superior military strategy
and tactics, and the unpopularity of
the corrupt KMT government,
communist forces under leader Mao
Zedong won the civil war and estab-
lished the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). The CCP victory
allowed for the creation of a strong
central government to rule a unified
country.5 The new state sought to
cement support from workers and
peasants by redistributing land and
limiting the influence of landlords,
capitalists, and foreigners. To achieve
its ends, the CCP chose to follow the
Soviet economic model: state owner-
ship, central planning, and rapid
industrialization.
In its early years, Mao’s new govern-
ment executed at least hundreds of
thousands, and more likely millions,
of landlords and accused counterrev-
olutionaries. An attack on intellec-
tuals in a 1957 “anti-rightist” cam-
paign stigmatized China’s educated
elite and set back economic and
technological progress. Then, in
1958, Mao implemented the even
more ambitious, and correspondingly
disastrous, “Great Leap Forward”
(GLF). The GLF intended to
modernize the country by setting up
backyard steel furnaces to double
steel production, and the government
recruited millions of peasants to work
in the newly created urban industries.
Tragically, the government’s decision
to take away the peasants’ suppos-
edly “surplus” agricultural products
induced the largest man-made
famine in human history, causing 
an estimated 30 to 40 million deaths
between 1959 and 1961. When 
the GLF failed, most of the new
recruits, along with some urban
workers, were dismissed and sent
back to their home villages, becom-
ing part of the biggest one-time
mass layoff in Chinese history.6
For a decade, beginning in 1966,
the “Cultural Revolution” attempted
to eliminate critics of Maoist poli-
cies, both within and outside the
party. In June 1966, the government
closed the schools and devoted
student time to “political” activities.
Radical students calling themselves
“Red Guards” sought to destroy
anything foreign or old; humiliated
and removed teachers, scientists,
“deviationist” thinkers, and others
who did not exhibit sufficient 
zeal for the Cultural Revolution;
and seized power from those who
were said to be “taking the capitalist
road,” including CCP Secretary
Deng Xiaoping and PRC President
Liu Shaoqi. During the first three
years of the Cultural Revolution,
the ACFTU, like other party insti-
tutions, was attacked and paralyzed,
and workers’ conditions deterio-
rated. Ultimately, the Cultural
Revolution’s absolutist approach
resulted in tragic and unnecessary
losses for China—the experience
and knowledge of its older people
and the educated class, as well as
significant educational opportunity
and progress for its youth.
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In its early years, Mao’s new government executed at least hundreds
of thousands, and more likely millions, of landlords and accused
counterrevolutionaries.
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Following this period, large state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), many of
which had begun in the KMT era
and expanded during the 1950s
through nationalization and recon-
struction, produced three-fourths 
of China’s industrial output. The
government set up a strict hierarchy
among workers. SOE workers,
drawn from the skilled and privi-
leged two-fifths of the urban work-
force, were kept quiescent through
benefits such as housing, medical
care, subsidized meals, bonuses,
government subsidies, lifetime
pensions, and welfare and state
insurance arrangements. Below 
the SOE workers were workers in
collective enterprises, and at the
bottom were “temporary workers.”7
Urban residents were much more
privileged than their rural counter-
parts. Migration from rural to urban
areas was virtually impossible.
“Market Socialism” and
Economic Growth
Following Mao’s death in September
1976, the remaining leaders—includ-
ing Mao’s wife and three aides labeled
the “Gang of Four”—were arrested
and deposed within a few weeks. The
excesses of the Cultural Revolution
had caused widespread revulsion,
and some of the most important tar-
gets of criticism were soon returned 
to positions of power. During the 
late 1970s, an economic reform
movement emerged under Deng
Xiaoping, who pursued economic
development through what he called
a Chinese form of “market socialism.”
This initiative aimed at maintaining
the CCP’s political control while
introducing capitalist free market
economic policies.
Deng’s goals included “Four Mo-
dernizations” in Agriculture, In-
dustry, Science and Technology, and
Defense. For example, under the
“production responsibility system,”
based on a reform originally devised
by peasants in Anhui Province,
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contracts between the production
team and the individual household
provided more incentives to the indi-
vidual farm family. Deng also encour-
aged foreign investors, joint ventures,
and manufacturers to set up shop in
China and produce goods for export
to developed country markets. His
policies brought dramatic macroeco-
nomic results. Starting in 1978, the
economy grew at a remarkable average
rate of 9 percent a year, matched in
2003 by 9.1 percent growth. Growth
tripled average incomes by the early
1990s and raised 200 million peas-
ants out of abject poverty.8
Along with economic growth came
the demand for more political
freedom, reflected in the Democracy
Wall movement of the late 1970s
and even larger mobilizations in the
late 1980s.9 For workers, a key moti-
vation was eliminating CCP corrup-
tion, which had allowed party leaders
and their families to profit from
insider deals as state enterprises were
sold. Wei Jingsheng, a leading figure
among Chinese worker dissidents 
of the period, challenged Deng’s
government to adopt a “Fifth Mod-
ernization”—democracy. In 1981,
the government responded to his
recommendation by placing him in
prison for almost two decades.
This incident and many others that
led up to the Tiananmen Square
protest and massacre of 1989
demonstrated that dynamic eco-
nomic growth had failed to generate
corresponding political openness 
in China. Nevertheless, the 1989
Tiananmen Square democracy
movement remains a defining point
for the country. It also marks the
first time (post-revolution) that
workers sought to form independent
worker organizations.
ACFTU Today
The ACFTU is still an integral part
of the state and CCP structures.
Most full-time union representatives
have not come from workers’ ranks,
but rather rose through the CCP
and were assigned to the ACFTU.
Although some experiments with
direct union elections have been
tested during the past few years, for
the most part the ACFTU is run
from CCP headquarters, whether at
the municipal, provincial, or
national level. Wang Zhaoguo,
who was appointed head of the
ACFTU in December 2002, is a
leader in the CCP, as were his 
predecessors. Another influential
ACFTU leader is Zhang Junjiu,
also a major party boss.
As part of its stabilization program
in the post-Mao period, the govern-
ment reestablished the ACFTU as
the single federation of all local
trade union councils and national
industrial trade unions. It is struc-
tured on a combination of geo-
graphic and industrial lines. By law,
every factory must contribute to the
union fund an amount equal to 2
percent of its total wage expenditure,
but many employers fail to comply.
The funds are largely controlled by
the local ACFTU offices.
On paper, the ACFTU is the largest
national labor organization in the
world, with more than 100 million
members and some 500,000 full-
time union staff. The consensus is
that these numbers are grossly in-
flated and that in many workplaces
where the ACFTU claims member-
ship, workers are unaware of the
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presence of an ACFTU branch.
One researcher cited a 2002 organiza-
tion audit, conducted by the Shaanxi
Provincial Federation, showing that
only 22 percent of the local unions
registered in workplaces in the pro-
vince actually existed.10 The ACFTU
tends to be present in what remains
of SOEs and in enterprises owned
or co-owned by regional and local
governments that deem it opportune
to maintain the ACFTU as a labor
control mechanism. ACFTU pres-
ence in private and foreign-owned
enterprises is generally low.
The Chinese government keeps
tight rein on the ACFTU and its
activities. China’s official labor
movement is based on a one-way
“transmission belt” model, where the
unions’ role is one of conveying
government policies to workers and
promoting labor discipline to imple-
ment those policies, as opposed to
representing workers in dealings
with employers and the government.
But the future of the labor move-
ment in China is still in flux. Just as
the CCP has factions, so does the
ACFTU. Some within the ACFTU
would like to see the organization
move toward a more progressive
position that creates space for work-
place policy and labor law reforms.
Although it is controlled by the
CCP, the ACFTU has a weak
bureaucracy whose function depends
greatly on the local party structure
and those who run it.
Today, Chinese workers do not
unquestioningly accept the trans-
mission belt model of CCP control
over trade unions. Some workers
seek new forms of independent
organization and action inside and
outside the ACFTU, even in the
face of government repression.
Hong Kong Confederation 
of Trade Unions
The largest independent trade union
movement in China is the Hong
Kong Confederation of Trade Unions
(HKCTU). The HKCTU, one of the
most progressive labor movements
in all of Asia, has been at the fore-
front of the struggle to defend Hong
Kong autonomy (one country/two
systems) and to advance Hong Kong
democracy, the rule of law, and re-
spect for human and worker rights.
It is a voice for the working men and
women of Hong Kong in an atmos-
phere starkly lacking in basic labor
protections, where a legal vacuum
undercuts workers’ rights to organize
and bargain collectively.
Today, the future of democratic rights
in Hong Kong remains in jeopardy.
In July 2003, more than 500,000
Hong Kong citizens marched in the
streets to protest a proposed security
bill aimed at restricting freedom of
assembly and freedom of expression.
The huge turnout helped pressure
Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung
Cheehwa to announce the bill’s
deferral, but the Beijing government
vowed to return later and pass an
alternate version of this law. The
following year, claiming that Hong
Kong was still not ready for democ-
racy, Beijing ruled out the use of
direct elections to select Hong
Kong’s next chief executive in 2007
and all of its legislators in 2008; the
government has set no timetable for
political reform.11
On July 1, 2004, despite attacks on
newspapers and media, thinly veiled 
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threats that a march could produce
violence, and a disinformation cam-
paign aimed at discouraging turnout,
more than one-half million Hong
Kong citizens declared again with
their feet their intention to press for
continued democratization and
reform. In September 2004 elections,
close to two-thirds of a record 1.7
million voters chose pro-democracy
candidates. Despite winning the
popular majority, however, the
democrats will hold only 25 of 60
seats. Thirty seats went to candidates
chosen by business and professional
groups mostly controlled by Beijing,
while electoral rules gave other seats
to pro-government candidates who
finished behind the democrats. Even
though the democrats are entering
office with a popular mandate for
change, they have no clear way of
legislating it.
The HKCTU was key to the success
of both the 2003 and the 2004
protests, enlisting the help of tens of
thousands of its union members to
provide volunteers and training and
to participate in the rally. Because
the HKCTU has also been involved
in the movement to promote worker
rights and democracy throughout
the mainland, it is a target of the
Beijing government.
A Global Giant
By many measures, China now has
the world’s second largest economy
after the United States. Although
some analysts think that China’s
growth trend will continue, others
believe that China’s rapid expansion
cannot be sustained and, if it falters
quickly and deeply, a global economic
recession could result.12
Regardless of the debate over the
impact of China’s growth, almost all
observers agree that the scale of
China’s industrialization is affecting
more people at once than any compa-
rable wave of factory production in
history. Since 1990, China’s manufac-
turing production has increased by
more than 400 percent. In 2003
alone, China’s total exports rose by 35
percent. China is the world’s biggest
supplier of consumer electronics,
computer hardware, and steel.
Chinese factories turn out 30
percent of the world’s air condi-
tioners and televisions, 40 percent of
the world’s mobile phones, half of
the world’s cameras, and half of its
shoes. In 2003, Chinese workers
assembled 40 percent of all laptops
(after making none only three years
earlier). Foreign direct investment
(FDI) to China (including Hong 
Kong) increased from $46.8 billion
in 2000 to $71.3 billion in 2003.
In early 2004, the largest source 
of investment in China was Hong
Kong, followed by investment from
the Virgin Islands.13
China’s extraordinary growth in
production and assembly has taken
place in an environment where
workers have had little or no access
to power. It has been accompanied
by corruption, pollution, wage and
social inequalities, unemployment,
precarious work, and labor exploita-
tion reminiscent of the worst features
of the Industrial Revolution in the
West. One dramatic reflection of the
downside of unregulated growth is
the volume of workplace injuries and
deaths. In 2002, workplace accidents
reportedly caused 140,000 deaths in
China, 250,000 workers lost body
parts and suffered other injuries, and
nearly 400,000 workers died from
the cumulative effects of workplace
illness. In Shenzhen alone, official
statistics indicate that an average of
31 workers per day were disabled
last year and that a worker died at
work every 4.5 days. Between
January and September 2004, offi-
cial statistics cite 609,429 work-
related accidents with a death toll of
98,809 workers.14
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Throughout China, 160 million
workers face hazardous working
conditions, but only a third are able to
get regular medical checkups. In
Guangdong Province, one of China’s
most rapidly industrializing areas,
more than half the factories have
never been examined for occupational
safety and health violations. Of the
inspected worksites, 96 percent have
been found to have such violations.
Occupational safety and health stan-
dards written by the central govern-
ment are not even communicated 
to regulatory agencies, so they cannot
be enforced.15
Most of China’s nearly 800 million
laborers still work in rural agricul-
ture, but tens of millions leave rural
areas each year to find work in cities,
in industry, and in rapidly growing
export factories in special economic
zones (SEZs, China’s equivalent of
export processing zones, or EPZs) 
in coastal areas.16 Beginning in the
mid-1980s, the government lifted its
ban on free travel by rural laborers.
Since then, 150 to 200 million
surplus laborers in rural areas have
migrated to urban industrial centers.
Most do not have permanent resi-
dency where they are employed, and
they bear the brunt of worker rights
violations. Migrant workers, the vast
majority of whom are women, are 
at the bottom of the social and
economic ladder. These workers
produce the bulk of export goods.
Today, approximately 160 million
workers are employed in formal
sector companies divided into differ-
ent types of firms: SOEs, privately
invested enterprises, foreign-invested
enterprises, joint ventures, urban
collectives and cooperatives, and
township and village enterprises.17
Another 100 million workers are
employed in other non-agricultural
jobs in urban areas.
Major multinational corporations
based in nearby Asian countries and
in the United States, Canada, and
Europe have set up extensive opera-
tions inside China, producing for
the Chinese domestic market and
for export back to their countries of
origin. Smaller companies are also
investing in China, and most com-
panies based in Hong Kong and
Taiwan employ significant numbers
of Chinese workers. Many non-
manufacturing multinational compa-
nies such as Wal-Mart have also
begun operations in China. In addi-
tion, China has spawned a growing
number of multinationals of its
own—such as Petro-China—that are
becoming key players in the interna-
tional economy.
China today faces both global
opportunities and challenges on a
scale that reflects its great size. Its
political, economic, and social
conditions are extremely complex,
and the country carries enormous
burdens and problems. It also has a
labor force of almost 800 million
workers who want to help resolve
those problems and take part in
building their society. They can only
do so once they are allowed to
develop an independent voice— 
a goal that remains elusive.
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1 Hong Kong was ceded to the British, Macao went to the Portuguese, and other territories called “concessions” went to Germany,
France, and Russia. Among the rights that China ceded to the “Great Powers” were the right to collect and keep customs duties; the
right for citizens to be tried by special international courts rather than Chinese courts for offenses committed in China; the right to build
and operate railways, mines, and other enterprises; and the right to protect these structures with their own armed forces.
2 See S. Bernard Thomas, Labor and the Chinese Revolution: Class Strategies and Contradictions of Chinese Communism, 1928-48 (Ann
Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies at The University of Michigan, 1983), pp. 1-2.
3 See Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1990), pp. 349-350.
4 See John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 299-301; Jonathan D. Spence, note 3 above,
pp. 498-499.
5 With the exception of Taiwan, the then-British colony of Hong Kong, and the Portuguese colony of Macao. 
6 The Chinese government never provided official figures for the death toll. However, numerous officials and scholars have commented on
the vast losses. For example, Chinese National Defense University professor Cong Jin wrote: “According to the statistics, in 1959, China
had a population of 672 million. In 1960, the number reduced to 662 million. The number was further reduced by 13 million in 1961. Adding
the number of newborns, the total number of the population in 1961 should exceed that of 1959 by 27 million. Adding the number of
deaths and of the unborn, from 1959 to 1961, the population was reduced by 40 million.” (Cong Jin, Winding Road, p. 272.) Well-known
scholar Jin Hui wrote: “During the disaster between 1959 to 1961, the ‘abnormal death toll’ in China was at least 40 million.” (Jin Hui,
“Memo on the ‘Three-Year Natural Disaster,’” Society magazine, 1993.) CCP Party History Institute Deputy Director He Liao Gaolong
wrote that the death toll during that three-year period was 40 million. (See Yuanhuang Chunqiu, No. 3, March 2000.) The mass layoff had
an extremely adverse impact on Chinese workers from rural areas. Millions of people not only lost their jobs, but also were “deported”
to their villages, where there was no job market.
7 See John King Fairbank, note 4 above, pp. 374-375. Temporary workers worked in every sector. Most were actually permanent
employees who nevertheless held a “temporary” official status.
8 Ibid., pp. 409-413; see also Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993), pp. 9-11; Asian Development Bank, Annual Report for 2003, 2004.
9 During the winter months of 1978-1979, thousands of people in Beijing posted complaints and protests about China’s ills on a stretch of
blank wall on Chang’an Avenue, to the west of the former Forbidden City. This became known as “Democracy Wall.” After initially toler-
ating the protests, the Chinese government cracked down, arresting and imprisoning the movement’s most prominent leaders. For more
information, see Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1986.
10 See Guan Ming, “Investigation and Thoughts on Union Organization,” Gongren Ribao, February 20, 2002, cited in Trini Leung, “ACFTU and
Union Organizing,” China Labour Bulletin, April 26, 2002. Available at http://www.china-labour.org.hk/iso/article.adp?article_id=2265&cate-
gory_name=Official%20Union%20%2d%20ACFTU 
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11 The commitment to increase the number of elected legislators to 100 percent was made under “basic law,” the common term for the
hand-over treaty from Britain to China. See Philip P. Pan, “Hong Kong Elections A Blow to Democrats,” Washington Post, September 13,
2004, p. A15; “Hong Kong’s Choice,” Editorial, Washington Post, September 14, 2004, p. A26.
12 See James Kynge, “All Eyes Are on the Economic Dynamo as the World Watches for Signs that Beijing’s Ever More Restrictive
Intervention Will Succeed in Bringing Expansion Under Control Without Sending the Country Spinning from Boom to Bust,” Financial
Times, May 3, 2004, p. 15.
13 See China Statistical Yearbook 2001, Table 17-4, p. 587; “China’s Total Trade Volume Hit US$851.2 billion Last Year,” People’s Daily Online at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200401/12/eng20040112_132381.shtml ; John Schmid and Rick Romell, “China’s Economic Boom Hits
Home,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, December 28, 2003, p. 1A; UNCTAD, “Table: FDI Flows Into Major Economies, 2001, 2002, 2003” at
www.unctad.org ; “Order from the Leadership of the State Council: To Watch the ‘Connection (or Transition) Station’ of Escaped Capital,”
21st Century Economic Report, August 7, 2004. According to this report, the Cayman Islands ranked number eight in investment in China.
The unusually high degree of investment coming from the Caribbean region has prompted the Chinese authorities to open an investiga-
tion into “escaped capital” and the possibility of the involvement of corruption money in foreign direct investment. 
14 See Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 321-325.
Official statistics on workplace accidents are combined with statistics on work-related traffic accidents, making it difficult to 
establish the number restricted to worksite safety or health issues. See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Statement 
of Mil Niepold (April 28, 2003); Joseph Kahn, “Making Trinkets in China, and a Deadly Dust,” New York Times, June 18, 2003, p. A1;
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-10-21/10293990219s.shtml 
15 See Tim Pringle and Stephen D. Frost, “The Absence of Rigor and the Failure of Implementation: Occupational Health and Safety in
China,” International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, Vol. 9, No. 4 (October/December 2003), p. 314.
16 This figure covers workers from all sectors, including agricultural workers.
17 People’s Republic of China, Census (2002).
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 1China and International Worker Rights Instruments
China has ratified four of the principal United Nations covenants on human and worker rights:
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
However, upon ratifying the ICESCR in 2001, China took the following “reservation” seeking to exempt
itself from the covenant’s obligations on freedom of association for workers:
The application of Article 8(1)(a) [on workers’ freedom of association] of the Covenant to the
People’s Republic of China shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of China, Trade Union Law of the People’s Republic of China and Labor Law of
the People’s Republic of China.
China has signed but not ratified the following principal UN covenant:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
China has ratified three of the ILO’s fundamental conventions reflected in the 1998 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work:
Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration
Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor
China has not ratified five of the ILO’s fundamental conventions:
Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor
Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining
Convention No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor
Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
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Overall, China has ratified 23 International LaborOrganization (ILO) con-
ventions. Before 1949, the KMT
government ratified 14 conventions.
In 1983, China announced its recog-
nition of these 14 ratifications but
revoked 23 that had been ratified by
the Taiwanese (Republic of China)
government. By the end of Sep-
tember 2003, China had ratified
another nine conventions. Some
ACFTU leaders are now calling 
on the government to ratify more
conventions.
However, China has not yet ratified
ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the
core conventions on freedom of
association and collective bargaining.
Conventions 87 and 98 require
countries to guarantee workers’
rights to freely form and join organi-
zations of their own choosing, to
choose their leaders and representa-
tives, and to define their own activi-
ties and goals—all independently of
government and of employers—as
well as to bargain collectively over
working conditions.
Like other countries that have not rati-
fied one or both of these conventions
(including the United States, Brazil,
India, and Mexico), China is obliged
to comply with the principles of
freedom of association by virtue of
membership in the ILO. Moreover, the
ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles and Rights at Work
says that “all members, even if they
have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation . . . to
respect, to promote, and to realize . . .
the principles concerning the funda-
mental rights which are the subject of
those Conventions. . . .” Conventions
87 and 98 are first among the four
principles cited.
The Chinese government signed the
UN International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) on
October 5, 1998. It has not yet rati-
fied the covenant, but the Chinese
People’s Congress has indicated plans
to do so in the near future.
China has ratified the UN International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), but it
asserted a “reservation” purporting to
exempt it from the obligation to 
guarantee workers’ freedom to form
and join trade unions of their own
choosing (see China and International
Worker Rights Instruments). How-
ever, China’s labor laws directly violate
the treaty obligations. In particular, a
clause in China’s 2001 Trade Union
Law declaring the ACFTU to be the
only union organization allowed to
exist in China rules out independent
organization. This clause violates the
core of Article 8(1)(a), which ensures
“the right of everyone to form trade
unions and join the trade union of 
his choice, subject only to the rules 
of the organization concerned, for 
the promotion and protection of his
economic and social interests.”
Since the reservation is incompatible
with the “object and purpose” of the
ICESCR, it is implicitly invalid,
and China’s obligations under the
ICESCR survive notwithstanding 
its reservation.1
China’s Labor Laws
China’s constitution and laws provide
for trade union organization, work-
place “consultation,” elections of
C H A P T E R  2
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trade union “committees,” and a role
for unions in case of strikes. How-
ever, these rights are tightly bound 
by ruling party command and state
control. Trade unions are not freely
chosen by workers, consultation is
not genuine collective bargaining,
and the right to strike is generally
not recognized in practice. Workers
exercise these rights at great risk to
their jobs and often to their personal
security.
International human and worker
rights bodies, independent human
rights groups, and international
worker rights experts have found
conclusively that China violates
workers’ freedom of association. First
and most obviously, China prohibits
independent union organizing.
Under Chinese law, the only union
organization allowed to exist is the
ACFTU and its branches: “The All-
China Federation of Trade Unions
shall be established as the unified
national organization.”2 Any inde-
pendent organization of workers’
own choosing is illegal.
In turn, the ACFTU is organically
tied to the ruling party. The Trade
Union Law requires the ACFTU 
to “take economic development as
the central task, uphold the socialist
road, uphold the people’s democratic
dictatorship, uphold leadership by the
Communist Party of China, uphold
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong
Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory,
uphold reform and opening up.”3
Contradictions abound in this formu-
lation. The instruction to “uphold
reform and opening up” means that
trade unions must support the govern-
ment’s globalizing economic policies
even when those policies hurt
workers. This negates unions’ repre-
sentation role. Economic develop-
ment is not the central task of trade
unions. Rather, unions’ central task is
to represent workers at the workplace
and in the political life of a nation 
to ensure that economic develop-
ment is not based on worker
exploitation and abuse. Through
collective bargaining and participa-
tion in democratic processes, trade
unions seek to have workers share 
in the gains of development, not 
pay the price of development for 
the benefit of ruling elites and inter-
national investors and executives.
This provision, like other 2001 revi-
sions to the Trade Union Law, shows
that “neither the Party [n]or the
government is willing to relax [its]
hold over the ACFTU; and even less
willing to allow legislative reform to
move in a direction that would enable
the union to represent workers’ inter-
ests . . . the revisions to the trade
union law testify to the fact that the
Party is not only unwilling to weaken
its hold over the unions, but even
wants to strengthen it.” 4
Right to Organize
The ILO’s Committee on Freedom
of Association (CFA) oversees ad-
herence to Conventions 87 and 98,
whether or not the government
concerned has ratified them. The
CFA has considered numerous
complaints about China.
In cases concluded through 1999, the
CFA has repeatedly found that the
Trade Union Law violates workers’
freedom of association and their
right to form and join trade unions
of their own choosing. The CFA
n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  
The instruction to “uphold reform and opening up” means that
trade unions must support the government’s globalizing economic
policies even when those policies hurt workers.
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includes its China cases in a limited
category called “serious and urgent.”
This category is reserved for egre-
gious worker rights violations and
signals the full weight of the ILO’s
call for accountability and reform.
Serious and urgent cases are defined
as those “that involve murder or
death threats, physical assaults . . .
arrests and detentions of trade union
leaders and members, obstruction of
trade union meetings and activities,
disciplinary measures following in-
dustrial action, legislation seriously
restricting the activities of trade
unions . . . and prohibition of inde-
pendent trade unions.”5
The CFA has identified the ACFTU
monopoly and its “transmission belt”
role as abuses that “prevented the
establishment of trade union organi-
zations that are independent of the
public authorities and of the ruling
party, and whose mission should be
to defend and promote interests of
their constituents and not to rein-
force the country’s political and
economic system.”6
The International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reported
in its 2003 Annual Survey of Violations
of Trade Union Rights that “trade
union rights are not respected in
China.” The ICFTU noted, “Workers
are prevented by law from organizing
outside the All-China Federation of
Trade Unions (ACFTU), which is
strictly controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party.” In March 2002,
the ICFTU filed a new complaint to
the CFA regarding “the use of repres-
sive measures including threats, in-
timidation, intervention by security
forces, beatings, detentions, arrests
and other mistreatment” against
worker organizers; in 2004 the CFA
dryly noted that it “is still awaiting
observations or information from the
government” in the case.7
A 2002 Human Rights Watch report
stated, “[T]he dual position of the
ACFTU—as upholder of working-
class interests and as loyal servant to
the Party—makes it impossible for
the union to promote free association
in accordance with international
standards. . . . It has not defended the
principle of independent union
organizing, and it has never spoken
out against laws and regulations
routinely employed to justify impris-
onment of labor activists who
organize outside its aegis.” Amnesty
International says, “Independent
trade unions are not permitted in
China. . . . The law still upholds the
existing monopoly of the ACFTU
and includes the subordination of
Chinese trade unions to the Chinese
Communist Party.” 8
The U.S. State Department’s
Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices 2003 said of workers’
freedom of association in China:9
“The Constitution provides for
freedom of association. However, in
practice, workers were not free to
organize or join unions of their own
choosing. The ACFTU, which was
controlled by the Communist Party
and headed by a high-level Party
official, was the sole legal workers’
organization. The Trade Union Law
gives the ACFTU control over the
establishment and operation of all
subsidiary union organizations and
activities . . . Independent unions
are illegal.”
Worker Organizing—
and Repression
Chinese workers do not docilely
accept the legal framework that
allows them no independent voice.
Government authorities clamp down,
but they cannot prevent workers 
from rising up to demand workplace
justice. Workers in China have a rich
history of searching for ways to
pursue their rights under repressive
Freedom of Association, Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
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conditions. That tradition has demon-
strated itself in recent times and
continues today.
Chinese workers face enormous risks
when they confront abusive employers
and repressive officials. Sometimes
they meet with violent force from
employer-hired thugs or from police
breaking up assemblies, demonstra-
tions, and protests. Authorities often
arrest, detain, and prosecute worker
leaders and worker advocates. The
following cases are drawn from
researchers at the Hong Kong-based
China Labour Bulletin, a respected
chronicler of worker rights violations
in China.10
Workers’ Autonomous
Federations
In the democratizing movements 
of the late 1980s, workers in many
regions organized Workers’ Auton-
omous Federations (WAFs) sepa-
rate from official ACFTU unions.
Many analysts of the period believe
that the government tolerated
dissent by students, writers, intellec-
tuals, and other groups, seeing no
menace to CCP control. However,
when workers began to organize
independently, the government
perceived a real threat. The Tian-
anmen massacre of 1989 was the
most visible reaction. Students were
the main victims, but authorities
decided to use deadly force when
they saw students and workers begin-
ning to link their protests. At the
same time, authorities moved
quickly and brutally to suppress
lesser-known workers’ movements
and to victimize lesser-known
worker organizers. Many of these
workers have been imprisoned. They
wait for the awakening of respect for
their rights, demonstrated by their
release and compensation for them-
selves and their families.11
n Guo Yunqiao, leader of a newly
formed WAF in Yueyang City,
Hunan, led a protest march
against the Tiananmen massacre.
He was arrested, quickly tried, and
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sentenced to death in September
1989. His death sentence was
commuted in 1991 to 13 years.
He was released in 2000.
n Li Wangyang, an organizer of the
Shaoyang City, Hunan, WAF, was
arrested in 1989 and sentenced to
a 13-year prison term on charges
of counterrevolutionary propa-
ganda and incitement. He was
released in June 2000 but rear-
rested a year later and sentenced
to ten more years for protesting
his treatment in prison. His sister,
Li Wangling, was also arrested
and sentenced to three years in
prison for helping to publicize 
Li’s protests.
n Xu Wangpin, arrested in 1989 for
organizing an independent union
at his factory in Sichuan, served
eight years in prison. He was then
rearrested for “disturbing social
order” and sentenced to another
prison term.
n Yao Guisheng, an activist in the
Changsha WAF in Hunan, was
arrested in 1989 for helping other
WAF members avoid police cap-
ture. He was sentenced to 15
years in prison, where he was
often placed in solitary confine-
ment for refusing to admit his
guilt. Yao suffered a mental break-
down from his treatment.
n Wang Miaogen, a member of the
Shanghai WAF, was arrested in
1989, jailed, and released in 1992.
A year later he was rearrested and
forcibly committed to a psychi-
atric hospital for planning a pro-
test demonstration during the
Asian Games of 1993.
n Zhang Shanguang was sentenced
to seven years’ imprisonment in
1989 for organizing the Hunan
WAF. He was rearrested in 1998
and charged with “passing intelli-
gence” outside China because he
filed reports with foreign radio
stations about worker protests in
his home county of Shupu. He
was sentenced to ten more years
in prison.
n Workers Chen Gang, Liu Zhihua,
and Peng Shi were arrested in
June 1989 for attempting to
organize a factory protest in
Hunan. Chen was sentenced to
death and the others to life terms
for “hooliganism.” Their sentences
were later reduced, and Chen and
Peng were released in 2004. Liu is
scheduled for release in 2011.
Free Labor Union of China 
In the early 1990s, even with the
memory of the 1989 crackdown
against WAFs still fresh and WAF
leaders and activists still imprisoned,
a new independent organizing
current called the Free Labor Union
of China (FLUC) took shape. The
government responded with the
same kind of repression, especially
against FLUC organizers in Beijing
arrested in 1992 for counterrevolu-
tionary activity. These leaders were
sentenced to long prison terms after
a mass trial in December 1994.
n Wang Guoqi was sentenced to 
11 years in prison. Authorities
suspended family visits in 1997 as
punishment for Wang’s failure to
memorize prison rules. He was
released in 2003 but reportedly
disappeared soon afterward during
a crackdown on dissidents.
n Liu Jingsheng, a leader of the
FLUC in a Beijing chemical
factory, was sentenced to 15 years
in prison.
n Kang Yuchun, a hospital re-
searcher active in the Beijing
FLUC, was sentenced to 17 years
in prison. He was released in 2003.
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Xu Wangpin, arrested in 1989 for organizing an independent
union at his factory in Sichuan, served eight years in prison.
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n Hu Shigen, who worked at the
Beijing Foreign Languages
Institute and became a FLUC
leader, was sentenced to 20 years
in prison.
Repression of Worker
Advocates
Chinese authorities target workers’
supporters as much as their leaders
and activists. Journalists, lawyers,
independent political activists, civil
servants, and others who devote
their skills to workers rather than 
to employers or the government are
especially victimized.
n Li Bifeng, formerly an officer at
Mianyang City Tax Bureau,
Sichuan Province, wrote an open
letter in 1997 to denounce violent
police action against massive
worker protests over the state’s
alleged misappropriations of
unemployment funds. Forced 
into hiding, he conducted a public
poll on layoffs, publicized worker
demands for reforms, and appealed
to international organizations to
support the laid-off workers’ right
to organize. He was arrested in
1998 and sentenced on trumped-
up fraud charges to seven years 
in prison.
n Zhao Changqing, a teacher at a
school affiliated with the Shaanxi
Hanzhong Nuclear Industry Fac-
tory, began advocating for better
conditions for factory workers and
criticizing the ACFTU for failing
to defend workers’ interests. He
was arrested in 1998 and sen-
tenced to three years in prison for
“disturbing social order.”
n In 1998, Yue Tianxiang started a
labor newsletter called Chinese
Workers’ Monitor and helped
promote legal action seeking
unpaid wages for workers at the
Tianshui Auto Transport com-
pany in Gansu Province. He was
arrested in 1999 and sentenced to
ten years in prison for “subverting
state power.”
n Xu Jian was a lawyer in Baotou
City, Inner Mongolia, who repre-
sented workers in state-owned
factories there. After a show tour
of a machinery factory by Presi-
dent Jiang Zemin in 1999, Xu
publicized the fact that workers
had not been paid for almost 
six months and filed lawsuits 
on their behalf. He was arrested 
and sentenced to four years in
prison for “incitement to subvert
state power.”
n Lu Wenbin, a reporter for the
Textile Daily newspaper, docu-
mented a strike and interviewed
workers at the Huainan textile
factory in Dafeng. Authorities
arrested him in December 2001.
n Cai Guangye, a doctor and photo-
journalist in Jilin Province, took
pictures and wrote essays publi-
cizing protests by workers in
chemical, metalworking, paper,
cement, and other industrial facto-
ries in Jilin. Police arrested him in
2001 and held him for two years
before imposing a three-year
sentence in July 2003.
n Wang Sen and Hu Mingjun,
leaders of the banned China
Democratic Party in Sichuan,
publicly supported protests over
unpaid wages by workers at the
Dazhou steel factory. They issued
statements backing independent
trade union formation. Authorities
arrested them in April and May
2001, respectively. First charged
with “inciting to subvert the power
of the state,” which carried a maxi-
mum five-year sentence, they were
convicted a year later on the more
serious charge of outright subver-
sion. Wang was sentenced to ten
years in prison, and Hu received
an 11-year sentence. Wang is
reportedly seriously ill with dia-
betes at a prison in Nan Chong
City, Sichuan, and not receiving
adequate care.12
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Liaoyang, Daqing, and Fushun:
Northeast Worker Protests
Workers’ fight for labor justice, in
China as throughout the world, is
irrepressible. Despite sustained
repression against independent
worker action throughout the 1990s,
the beginning of the twenty-first
century saw workers in China contin-
uing to struggle for their rights.
The most notable upsurges took
place in traditional industrial areas
of the northeast, where workers were
hardest hit by mass unemployment
after the economic restructuring of
SOEs. Instead of consulting with
workers and negotiating restruc-
turing plans for a smooth transition,
company managers often laid work-
ers off, looted their pension funds,
defrauded them of severance pay,
and pocketed months’ worth of 
their salaries.
Liaoyang
For decades, the Liaoyang Ferroalloy
factory in Liaoning Province was a
source of steady employment for area
workers. Workers helped make the
foundry and metal processing firm a
successful, profitable operation with
sales in both domestic and interna-
tional markets. In 2002, government
officials and company managers
engineered a bankruptcy that left
thousands of employees without
pensions, social insurance, and pay-
ment for work performed. As
Human Rights Watch recounted:13
“The plant’s former workers trace its
terminal decline to alliances between
Gong Shangwu, first Liaoyang Party
Secretary and later mayor and
Liaoyang People’s Congress chair-
person, and corrupt managers at
Ferroalloy who, they say, conspired
to close the factory for their own
personal gain. The accusations were
supported by an official legal case
against six senior figures connected
with the plant, one of whom was
convicted on corruption charges.
As reported in the official Liaoyang
Daily, over Rmb 5.3 million
[$689,000] in embezzled funds,
assets, and bribes has been recov-
ered; and authorities have claimed
they are chasing another Rmb 2.9
million [$377,000]. The plant started
to lose money in 1995, but, accord-
ing to an open letter from irate
workers to the governor of  the
province, management continued 
to issue false reports indicating net
profits to justify awarding them-
selves large bonuses.”
Workers organized mass protests.
Employees of area auto parts, elec-
trical equipment, steelmaking, and
precision tool factories facing similar
problems joined Ferroalloy workers in
the movement. On March 11-12,
2002, some 17,000 workers rallied in
protest. Police arrested four key
leaders for “organizing illegal demon-
strations”: former steelworker Yao
Fuxin and Ferroalloy workers Xiao
Yunliang, Pang Qingxiang, and
Wang Zhaoming. On March 18,
30,000 workers from Ferroalloy and
20 other area factories staged an even
bigger demonstration to protest the
arrests and demand release of their
detained leaders.
National government officials in
Beijing responded by ordering a
crackdown on protests and lodging
more serious accusations against
detainees. Police used physical attacks,
arrests, and jailhouse beatings of
participants to break up new, smaller
protests. The arrested leaders were
sentenced to up to seven years in
prison, this time for the more serious
charge of “subversion,” because their
cases were publicized by advocates in
Hong Kong and other countries.
Their trial lasted one day, and they
had no access to their lawyers before
the trial.
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The indictment handed down
against protest leaders gives chilling
confirmation of the government’s
repressive response:14
“During February and March 2002,
Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory went
legally bankrupt, and some laid-off
workers who did not understand [the
situation] were dissatisfied. Defen-
dants Yao Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang
took advantage of these objective
conditions, and plotted to organize
demonstrations and protests. On
March 11, defendants Yao Fuxin,
Xiao Yunliang and others, without
applying for permits, organized some
workers of the Liaoyang Ferroalloy
Factory to carry out illegal assembly,
demonstration and protests, [thus]
seriously disturbing functions of state
organs. In front of the main entrance
of the city government [compound],
the two defendants also gave inflam-
matory speeches.
“Despite being reprimanded by the
Public Security office, on March 12
Yao and Xiao organized another
illegal assembly, demonstration and
protest. On March 18, 19, and 20
respectively, Xiao Yunliang, Pang
Qingxiang, and others again organ-
ized illegal assemblies, demonstra-
tions and protests. Moreover, they
ignored orders to disperse, disturbed
the proper work of state organs,
even blocked street traffic for a long
period of time, and caused a severe
disruption of the public order.
“They also made contact with
reporters at Agence France Presse
and the Wall Street Journal in order
to pressure the government by publi-
cizing information about their illegal
demonstrations and activities; thus
having a major influence. Foreign
media covered this event extensively
through the Internet and exagger-
ated the facts of the situation,
creating a despicable impression.
“Defendants Yao Fuxin and Xiao
Yunliang were caught by the Public
Security office and brought to
justice.”
In late 2003, Yao and Xiao were
transferred from Jinzhou prison to a
penal colony near the Mongolian
border notorious for harsh conditions
and treatment. The prison’s remote
location meant a daylong trip for
visiting family members. A U.S.
reporter seeking to interview Yao’s
wife about his condition recounted:15
“The wives are apparently kept under
some kind of house arrest. . . .Three
officials nabbed me outside Mr.
Yao’s home. . . . I was traveling with
a colleague . . . and my intrepid 9-
year-old son, and we were all taken
to a nearby hotel. They let us use
the bathroom—under careful escort
in case we tried to break out.
“ ‘China is a country of laws,’ the
leader explained, after offering us
cigarettes. ‘So your interviews must
go through State Council rules and
local officials. You must go through
the procedures for this to be legal.
So interviews now are impossible.
But you are welcome to come back
to Liaoyang any time as a tourist.’
“ ‘Well, then,’ I suggested, ‘I’ll go and
talk to Yao Fuxin’s family about the
local tourist spots.’
“They didn’t even crack a smile.
Instead, they put one goon in my
taxi and sent another carload to
escort us to the Shenyang airport
and wait there until we boarded a
plane to Shanghai. My son was
tailed in the airport as he went to
get an ice cream.”
In April 2004 the ILO’s CFA
rebuked Chinese authorities for their
repression of the Liaoyang protest
leaders. The CFA couched its con-
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clusions in diplomatic language, but
its import was unmistakable:16
“The Committee deplores . . . that
the events in connection with the
dispute were related to the bank-
ruptcy of the factory and its conse-
quences on the workers, yet Yao
Fuxin and Xiao Yunliang were
charged with and sentenced for
subversion. . . . The most specific
information provided by the govern-
ment refers to the creation of distur-
bances, fabrication of rumors . . .
disturbing the normal working
order of the [city government], and
causing a traffic jam. . . . The Com-
mittee cannot comprehend how
such vague and general accusations
can lead to the conviction of such a
serious crime as subversion. . . .
The Committee deeply regrets the
government’s disregard for essen-
tially all of its previous recommen-
dations in this very serious case and
its perseverance in the punishment
of acts related to labor conflict with
lengthy terms of imprisonment for
acts of subversion on the basis of
general and vague accusations.”
Daqing
The Daqing oil fields became a
center of China’s economic develop-
ment in the late 1950s. Vast oil
resources fueled national industry
and gave work and good wages to a
quarter-million employees.
A shift in 2000 to private ownership
under Petro-China, with listing on
the Hong Kong and New York stock
exchanges, brought restructuring 
and layoffs of tens of thousands of
workers. As in Liaoyang, however,
government officials and company
managers refused to consult with
workers and negotiate a transition and
restructuring plan that took workers’
concerns into account. Instead of
defending employees, the official
ACFTU union—headed mostly by
managers—backed company moves.
Petro-China reneged on promises to
maintain social insurance for laid-
off workers and to pay heating
allowances, an important benefit in
the long winter. In early March 2002,
thousands of workers took to the
streets to protest their treatment.
Protest organizing was decentralized,
without named individuals in public
leadership roles, so police made
“snatch” arrests of anyone who ap-
peared to speak or direct activities.
According to Amnesty International,
“several injuries were reported on 19
March when paramilitary clashed
with the demonstrators.”17 For several
weeks afterward, protests continued
in a similar pattern—decentralized,
anonymous organization by workers
met with physical violence and deten-
tions by authorities.
Fushun
Fushun is a major coal mining center
in Liaoying Province in the northeast.
China’s coal industry was another
pillar of its industrial development in
the last half of the twentieth century.
The industry is still notorious for
hazardous conditions and thousands
of worker fatalities each year. Esti-
mates of coal miner deaths vary
between 10,000 and 40,000 annually,
but even the official statistic of 10,000
fatalities accounts for two-thirds of the
world’s mining fatalities.18
The coal industry reached a crisis of
overproduction in the late 1990s,
n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  
In newly privatized enterprises, company managers and corrupt
government officials conspired to sell themselves the firms at 
artificially low prices, then robbed pension and benefit funds 
to pay themselves while laying off thousands of workers.
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leading to mass layoffs. In Fushun,
more than 300,000 coal miners lost
their jobs. As in the Ferroalloy and
Petro-China cases, company man-
agers threw the workers aside with
minimal severance pay and social
insurance.
In March 2002, thousands of
workers launched protests. To avoid
arrest, protest organizers publicized
the action by placing posters around
the city during the night. Fushun
officials distributed cash bribes to
protesters and deployed police to
arrest those who would not give up.19
Protests Continue
Throughout 2003, workers’ assemblies
and protests continued. In many cases,
the same abuses sparked their actions.
SOEs laid off massive numbers of
workers in the name of global compet-
itiveness. Managers and union leaders
imposed layoff terms on employees,
often cutting their severance pay and
pension plans without consultation or
negotiation with genuine workers’
representatives. In newly privatized
enterprises, company managers and
corrupt government officials conspired
to sell themselves the firms at artifi-
cially low prices, then robbed pension
and benefit funds to pay themselves
while laying off thousands of workers.
Victimized workers who organized
demonstrations met the same pattern
of response seen in the Northeast
movement a year earlier. Authorities
arrested and imprisoned worker
leaders and advocates and used police
to crush the protests:
n In early 2003, workers at the Tieshu
textile factory in Suizhou, Hubei,
who had been left with slashed
pension funds and worthless com-
pany shares, mounted mass demon-
strations at factory gates to protest
the company’s refusal to hold
genuine negotiations over effects 
of layoffs. Police responded with a
door-to-door hunt for protest
leaders and arrested nine workers
identified as protest organizers.
Tried in April 2004 for “disturbing
public order,” the nine await
sentencing.
n In March 2003, workers at the
newly privatized Liangshan paint
factory in Shandong Province 
protested pay cuts and layoffs.
Management of the private firm
that had taken over the plant, the
Liantian Chemical Engineering
company, brought in armed thugs,
who hauled away and beat three
worker leaders: Jing Yongqiang,
Tian Junfeng, and Hou Zhaohua.
They broke Hou’s wrists in the
beating.
n In September 2003, hundreds of
workers at the Liangshan steel
factory in Sichuan protested layoff
terms that company managers and
city officials had drawn up without
consultation or negotiation with
employees. Authorities sent riot
police to break up the demonstra-
tions. More than 100 protesters
were detained, and many were held
for weeks without charges until
protests dissipated.
n In November 2003, workers at the
Xiangyang auto parts company in
Xiangfan City, Hebei, protested
privatization plans—announced
with no consultation or negotiation
with genuine workers’ representa-
tives—that left thousands unem-
ployed. At the same time, because
company-provided housing was
also being privatized, workers faced
steep rent increases. Police de-
tained ten leaders of the movement
and released their names publicly,
creating a de facto blacklist of
workers who can now be shunned
as “troublemakers” by all area
employers.
One Worker’s Lost Voice
Cao Maobing worked at the Funing
County silk mill in Yancheng, Jiangsu
Province. He organized an inde-
pendent trade union in 2000, when
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the ACFTU branch did nothing
about corruption, failure to pay sever-
ance and pensions to laid-off workers,
unpaid wages, and other abuses. As
Cao told foreign reporters, “The
factory does have a union, but it exists
in name only. The current union takes
no responsibility for the workers. . . .
So we told them we’ll set up a trade
union ourselves. Whether the trade
union is independent or not, or whose
administration it comes under, is not
important. What is important is that
it is elected by the workers them-
selves, and it acts on their behalf.”20
For his actions and his statements,
Cao was arrested in December
2000. He was forcibly committed 
to a psychiatric hospital, where he
endured drug therapy and repeated
electric shock treatments for what
authorities deemed “obsessive-com-
pulsive disorder.” He was released
after several months, when workers’
protests had faded. Authorities dis-
connected his phone, and Cao left
the city.
Right to Bargain Collectively
China’s labor laws call for “collective
contracts” in workplaces with trade
unions (always ACFTU affiliated)
but define such contracts as resulting
from collective “consultation,” not
collective bargaining. The law
mostly reflects the myth that under
socialism—now called market social-
ism—workers and employers have
no differences. Instead, they must 
sit on the same side of a “consulta-
tion” table.
China’s Trade Union Law compels
unions to make economic develop-
ment their central task and to serve
as a worker control mechanism for
meeting development goals. In
contrast to this hands-on approach
toward union control, the govern-
ment’s policy toward companies is
hands-off, letting them find the
fastest way to profitability and
growth without regard for worker
rights. This combination transforms
unions into representatives of manage-
ment toward workers rather than
representatives of workers toward
management.
The law does not recognize that
workers and employers can have
contending interests to be negotiated
and compromised through arms-
length, independent bargaining.
However, under Article 33 of the
labor law, in factories without a union,
workers have the right to reach agree-
ment with their employer on a collec-
tive contract through representatives
of their choosing, and to ratify the
agreement in a representative or
general assembly.21 This provision
does not measure up to standards of
freedom of association. However,
while not going far enough, it may
nevertheless represent a small, prac-
tical opening for some workers to
undertake bargaining with their
employers independent of the
ACFTU and democratically adopt
collective bargaining agreements.
The reality is that the majority of
workers in China are not allowed to
engage in genuine collective bargain-
ing or be represented by leaders of
their own choosing. In a March 2003
radio interview, a woman worker 
at the Kang En paper factory in
Sichuang County, Zhejiang, said of
the state-owned company’s stock
ownership scheme for workers:22
“Before we felt we all had rights as a
collective, whereas now it’s all down
to the individual. And I don’t mean
us workers. I mean a few individual
officials. . . . The shares get divided
up among the bosses, they grab
them. . . . We don’t have the same
status as before. We no longer feel
it’s our enterprise. In the old days
we were seen as ‘masters of the
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enterprise,’ but now everything’s
down to the say-so of a few people.
That’s the difference. It’s like we’re
just hired hands.”
Asked whether the trade union was
any help, she replied, “Not that I 
can see. . . . It’s pretty much a mirage.
. . . [Management] chooses the 
chairperson.”
Company management normally
appoints top union representatives.
Most elections, if they are held at all,
are rubber-stamping exercises. Full-
time union officials get senior man-
agement salaries and sit on boards of
directors or supervisory boards of
companies. They regard themselves
as members of the senior manage-
ment team.
Ning Jiaxin, a worker at a Velcro
factory in Tangxia, told a reporter,
“I don’t remember who the union
chairman is. It might be the boss
himself, or the deputy general
manager, his younger brother.”23
Dou Xiandong, a welder at a steel-
making factory in Tangxia, said,
“The union belongs to the boss. He
appointed the union chairman. Most
of the bosses in private enterprises
appoint their own union chairmen.”24
Independent scholars who have
studied the consultation system on
the ground report that it “encourages
identification of the trade union
with management’s priorities.” The
researchers explain:25
“It is not so much that the trade
union is subordinated to manage-
ment as that the trade union is an
integral part of the management
apparatus . . . . For most trade union
cadres at the workplace, the idea of
representing and protecting the
legitimate rights and interests of
their members in opposition to 
the employer is something that 
is unfamiliar, if not entirely alien,
to their traditional practice and to
their traditional conception of their
role, which is to serve the interests
of the enterprise.”
An ACFTU union representative
told a researcher:26
“When workers complained that
their wages were too low, we
couldn’t negotiate this issue with 
the director face to face . . . if this
factory was bankrupt, the workers
would lose their rice bowls . . .
Whether or not there will be raising
of wages will finally be determined
by the director. Concerning the
issue of reducing staffing, what we
can do is to do ideological work
with the workers . . . letting them
know . . . if they have bad job
performance, they will run the risk
of being made unemployed.”
Many union officials are either true
managers or CCP cadres who come
from management jobs or party ranks.
According to a survey in Zhejiang
Province, more than 75 percent of
union leaders came from those two
sources, while only 11 percent came
from worker ranks.27
One officer of the Chinese employ-
ers’ federation told researchers that
trade unions are “just a branch of
management” whose role is not so
much to represent workers as to
explain to workers why the company
cannot increase their wages or why
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layoffs will help the company. As
another research group put it,
“Chinese unions function more as
an offshoot of the HR department,
and are primarily concerned with
supporting managerial interests.”28
The agreements and practices that
result from the consultation system
are perversions of rights to collective
representation and bargaining. In a
case reported in the Workers Daily, a
Hong Kong-based company with an
apparel factory in Chengdu adver-
tised to recruit a trade union chair-
person from outside the factory after
plant management was unhappy with
workers’ choice of a chairperson.29
Most workers take shop floor prob-
lems to supervisors, not to union
representatives. One company went
so far as to fine workers who sought
help from the union instead of going
to management. In June 2003, Xiong
Zhengsheng, Wu Sheng, and Wang
Zhengquan, who worked at the Feng
Cheng Electric Power Company in
Feng Cheng City, Jiangxi Province,
appealed to the city’s ACFTU for
assistance in a dispute with their
employer. Management responded
by deducting 200 Rmb [about $26]
from the workers’ monthly salaries
and issuing a company regulation
that prohibited workers from ap-
pealing to upper level ACFTU offi-
cials: “Workers will be deducted 200
Rmb if they appeal once, 400 if they
appeal twice.”30
When workers step forward as
genuine representatives of their
colleagues in dealing with manage-
ment, consequences can be dire. At
the Taiwanese-owned Pan-America
Plastic Cement and Glass Fiber
Company in Dongguan, 200
employees chose 36-year-old Wang
Zhaoming and two co-workers,
Zhang Junfeng and Yuan Qing, to
seek unpaid overtime from the com-
pany. After the representatives raised
the workers’ demand at an August
2002 meeting, management demoted
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the three from technicians to janitors
and cut their pay. When they ap-
pealed to authorities, the company
fired them.
In October 2002, electrician Chen
Zhihong appeared as a witness for the
three leaders in an arbitration case.
The company fired him. When he
came to the plant to question his
dismissal, company security guards
beat him and threw him out. Thirty-
nine workers signed a letter protesting
management’s actions. The company
dismissed them and circulated their
names to all the firms in the region on
a blacklist, labeling them as “trouble-
makers” who should not be hired.31
“Bargaining” on One Side 
of the Table
Traditional collective bargaining
almost never takes place, although
some experiments have been con-
ducted in the southern part of China
with union elections and collective
bargaining. Chinese press reports
indicate that on rare occasions, grass-
roots ACFTU leaders, especially the
few who have been elected, have
solicited proposals from their
constituencies. For example, at the
Hangzhou ARCA Industrial Co.,
Ltd., a footwear production company
with 2,500 employees in Zhejiang
Province, the company allowed the
direct election of union leaders
because foreign buyers exerted pres-
sure to improve worker rights condi-
tions. The signed union contract
prevented the company from firing
union leaders and provided workers
with new benefits. The Hangzhou
Daily reported that such elections are
being conducted in 310 enterprises
in Yuhang District, which is the
industrial section of Hangzhou City,
including 70 percent of its private
enterprises.32
However, most researchers have not
found cases where members’
proposals have been solicited or the
ACFTU has submitted drafts of
union proposals to members for their
approval before making proposals to
management. Even more startling is
the complete blending of labor and
management at the consultation
table. Researchers reported:33
“We found no cases of conflict
between trade unions and manage-
ment in the process of collective
consultation. . . . In some enterprises
senior members of management
actually participated in the negotia-
tions on the trade union side. In one
enterprise the finance director was 
a member of the trade union team
in the consultation committee. In
another enterprise, a senior financial
manager participated on the trade
union side in an advisory capacity.
At the same time, the trade union
President, as a member of the Board
of Directors or Supervisory Board,
usually participates in the formula-
tion of management’s response to
the trade union proposals for the
collective contract. This is an indi-
cation of the extent to which neither
the trade union nor the employer
distinguish[es] the trade union’s role
as representative of the employees
from its role as representative of the
enterprise.”
Zhen Yinbing, an ACFTU union
chairman at a Tangxia steel factory,
described his role this way: “Who do
I represent? Both the boss and the
workers. If I speak at a meeting, I’ll
say, ‘First, on behalf of the general
manager . . .’ and then I’ll say,
‘Second, on behalf of the union . . . .’
I know it’s hard to understand, but
it’s the truth.” 34
Most collective agreements consist of
nothing more than a promise by
management to pay the legal mini-
mum wage and obey other minimum
conditions set by labor laws, along
with a union’s commitment to help
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boost productivity. If a contract has
an additional clause or two, it might
provide for more company-sponsored
picnics than the year before.
Unions’ submission of contracts to
members for their approval is “more
of an exercise in propaganda and
persuasion than of the active partici-
pation of the membership.” Where
wages are discussed, ACFTU unions
often support management demands
for higher pay for already higher-paid
workers at the expense of lower-paid
workers. “In all cases,” researchers
reported, “the trade union endorsed
the widening of differentials and took
it upon itself to persuade the first-line
[lower-paid] workers of the need for
increased inequality and their restraint
in the interests of the enterprise.”35
In a September 2003 telephone
interview, Han Dongfang of China
Labour Bulletin asked a trade union
chair whether the union supported
workers’ protest of inadequate sever-
ance pay at the Suizhou fuel pump
and nozzle factory in Hubei. The
chair responded:36
“No, not the trade union. We have 
to follow the party committee’s
instructions. . . . It is required that
the trade union has to be under the
party committee. Now the party
committee asked us to do ideolog-
ical work with the workers, to give
them the right thoughts. . . . The
measures we take have to be better
ways, like the more reasonable and
lawful ways. This is the way we
guard their rights.”
An ACFTU official at a joint venture
company run by a prominent multi-
national corporation told a senior
international trade union leader that
the union would oppose a wage
increase even if the company volun-
tarily offered one. The ACFTU
leader said that a raise would trigger
similar demands by workers in other
export zone area factories.37
Wal-Mart in China
The approval of Normal Trade
Relations for China in 2000 was seen
by proponents as a measure that
would “help open markets to
American products and help export
American values, especially freedom
and entrepreneurship.” 38 In Wal-
Mart’s case, exporting American
values amounted to exporting U.S.-
style anti-unionism to China. Despite
the ACFTU’s subservient role, and
its principal role as a labor control
mechanism, the U.S.-based multina-
tional retailing giant could not bring
itself to deal with the official union.
By April 2004, Wal-Mart had 37
stores in 18 Chinese cities, with
more stores in development. Under
the Trade Union Law, the company
is required to recognize the ACFTU
union for its employees and to con-
tribute 2 percent of its total wage
expenditure to the union fund. But
since entering China more than
three years ago, Wal-Mart has
scoffed at the law, refusing to allow
ACFTU presence in its stores.
ACFTU officials complain that 
“it is impossible for such a big
company to have no trade union”
and “multinational companies must
abide by Chinese law.” To date, the
ACFTU has had virtually no success
in getting government authorities 
to enforce the law. However, in
November 2004, under heavy 
pressure from the National People’s
Congress and the ACFTU, Wal-
Mart announced that it would allow
ACFTU branch unions to be 
established in its retail operations 
in China.39
But these relatively few retail stores
do not reveal the scope of the prob-
lem. Even if Wal-Mart becomes open
to a union presence, the hundreds of
thousands of workers who produce in
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obscurity for Wal-Mart stores
throughout the world—including
5,400 factories in China alone—will
still not be adequately protected.40
In February 2004, China Labor
Watch and the National Labor
Committee issued a report on worker
rights violations by Wal-Mart
suppliers in China. A simultaneous
front-page story in the Washington
Post prompted widespread follow-up
by Chinese journalists. One wrote:41
“On February 8, the Washington Post
criticized as no longer effective Wal-
Mart’s inspections of suppliers’ labor
rights. The report said that factories
usually received advance notice of
inspections and that they then
cleaned up, manufactured fake work
hour sheets, and told workers how to
respond to inspectors’ questions, etc.
“The next day, the National Labor
Committee and China Labor
Watch released a report criticizing
Wal-Mart for ignoring poor work
environments, paycheck deductions
from employees’ lowest wages, and
forced overtime in its Dongguan
City supplier factories.When this
reporter went to the criticized Heyi
plastic cement factory in Sanbaitang
district, a manager explained that it
is difficult to get Wal-Mart orders.
Heyi is afraid that if Wal-Mart dis-
covers that another supplier factory
in the same category is cheaper than
them, even by only a few fen [the
smallest denomination in Chinese
currency], Wal-Mart will immedi-
ately end its contract with Heyi 
and move its orders to the cheaper
factory. Heyi can only cut production
costs by lowering workers’ wages,
extending work hours, etc., in viola-
tion of labor rights. The pressure of
Wal-Mart’s low prices competition is
therefore shifted onto workers.
People in the industry sum up Wal-
Mart’s methods as The Law of the
Jungle: the most ruthless succeed.”
Right to Strike
In 1975, when China amended its
constitution, Mao asked for the
inclusion of the right to strike as a
cosmetic gesture. In 1982, the
government dropped it in honest
recognition of the reality. Official
ideology decreed that conflict was
not possible between workers and
managers in a socialist system. Today,
there is still no direct acknowledg-
ment of workers’ right to strike.
This situation might leave a minor
opening to explore, however. Under
principles of civil law, what is not ex-
pressly forbidden is permitted. Taking
this concept into account, worker ad-
vocates could argue that strikes are
not actually prohibited in China. How-
ever, while this interpretation may be
occasionally helpful to workers inside
China in a transitional environment,
it is important to note that it is not
sufficient to bring Chinese law into
conformity with core labor standards.
Moreover, the government’s practical
policy is clear; any attempt by workers
to strike is quickly suppressed.
The government’s political distaste
for this basic element of freedom of
association is reflected in the law’s
avoidance of the use of the word
“strike” (bagong) altogether. Instead,
the law refers to stoppage (tinggong)
or slowdown (daigong). Article 27 of
the 2001 Trade Union Law states:
“In case of a work-stoppage or a go-
slow in an enterprise, the trade union
shall represent staff and workers in
consultation with the enterprise,
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institution or relevant party, and shall
reflect the opinions and demands of
staff and workers as well as raise
solutions. The enterprise or institu-
tion shall strive for a settlement with
the reasonable demands made by the
staff and workers. The trade union
shall strive hard in its task to assist
the enterprise or institution to restore
the normal order of production as
soon as possible.”
Some commentators see the new
provision as an implied right to strike
because it concedes the existence of
stoppages and slowdowns and author-
izes trade unions to “strive for a settle-
ment” rather than ban the actions.
But experts at the Hong Kong
Liaison Office (IHLO), the official
representation of the ICFTU and
Global Union Federations (GUFs) in
Hong Kong, argue that “the text of
the revised law provides no evidence
to support this claim.” 42
IHLO analysts point out that local
authorities decide what are “reasonable
demands” and that if authorities deem
such demands “unreasonable,” workers
may face repression. Furthermore, the
emphasis in this section of the law is
on the requirement that trade unions
work to restore production as soon as
possible. This conditionality reflects
the position taken by CCP officials
during discussions of the Trade Union
Law revisions when it was asserted
that “. . . trade unions also play a role
in persuading and directing workers to
help continue production.”43
Most important, Article 27 offers 
no protection or legal guarantees to
workers engaged in industrial action,
whether strikes, stoppages, or slow-
downs. In July 2003, some 1,800
workers at the Zaoyang fertilizer
factory in Hubei struck to protest
layoff terms imposed on them without
consultation or negotiation. City offi-
cials ordered police to detain leaders
and require other strike participants to
report to police headquarters. Workers
who reported were also detained.
In October 2003, more than 1,000
armed police attacked thousands of
protesting workers at the Nanchong
textile mill in Sichuan. The workers
were striking against layoff plans 
that left half the plant’s force with
slashed pensions and benefits and
claimed two months’ unpaid wages
for work already performed. Police
arrested dozens of workers and
protest leaders at the scene, and more
in door-to-door sweeps through
workers’ homes. Again, authorities
held these activists for weeks until the
protest movement abated.
In May 2004, workers at the Xin Ang
shoe factory in Dongguan City, a sub-
contracted supplier to several multina-
tional firms, struck to protest withheld
wages and oppressive working condi-
tions. Management deducted workers’
pay for failing to make impossible
production quotas; forced daily and
weekend overtime on workers up to
15 hours per day; pulled, slapped, and
pinched workers for not working fast
enough; and failed to provide gloves
and masks to prevent poisoning by
chemicals used in the production
process. When workers went on strike,
management summoned hundreds of
police officers, who attacked the
strikers and arrested leaders. As of
August 2004, they had not been
released, and police continued to with-
hold their names as well as the charges
against them. Sowing fear among
plant workers, management is telling
them that the arrested leaders face 15
years in prison. IHLO experts
conclude:44
“The fact is that workers arrested for
organizing and leading strikes or
forming independent trade unions in
the past have not been dealt with
under existing labour and trade
union laws, but have been persecuted
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under criminal laws. If this is the
case, then we must ask how revisions
to the Trade Union Law make any
difference to workers’ perceptions of
how free they are to organize unions
and/or engage in strike action.”
ACFTU Officials on Strikes
Early in 2003, workers at the Luyuan
timber company in Suichang County,
Zhejiang, struck for two weeks to pro-
test management’s failure to consult
workers over restructuring plans and
employee stock ownership. In a tele-
phone interview with Han Dongfang
of China Labour Bulletin, the chair-
man of the ACFTU county labor
federation had this to say about the
local union leadership at the plant:45
“The work of the trade union in this
enterprise is rather weak. . . . [Zhang
Xingquo], the chairman of the trade
union, is also the vice president of
the enterprise. . . . He used to be a
deputy director of the Economic and
Trade Committee in Suichang
County. Later the factory recruited
him. He is a manager of the factory.”
In October 2003, Han conducted a
telephone interview with a worker
from a cotton spinning mill in
Nanchong, Sichuan, where police had
arrested leaders of a three-day strike
by 5,000 workers protesting manage-
ment’s layoff plan. The worker said
that “more than a thousand” armed
police broke up the strike: “They
came at 2 or 3 a.m. [on October 10]
and took away quite a number of
workers, they wanted to stop our
protest. You know, they filmed the
strike with video cameras and came
to arrest us at night . . . at our homes.
They came while we were sleeping.”
Han contacted a union official from
the ACFTU city labor federation to
ask what the trade union was doing
about the conflict. The union official
responded:
“Don’t you know the situation in
China? Do you think the trade
union in China can really represent
the workers to negotiate with the
government? . . . Now the trade
union can only represent the party
committee in doing some ideological
work on the workers, to explain to
them the party’s intentions and solu-
tions. . . . We trade unions are under
the party committee’s control.”
Han then contacted a local union
official, who added, “So workers are
not happy with us. It is like they are
fighting for their rights and we are the
bad guys to interfere. But you know,
we just can’t say ‘no’ to our leaders. . . .
it is just too difficult to handle, to
balance the leaders’ instructions and
the workers’ feelings.”46
Strike Over Pay Cuts
In April 2004, hundreds of workers
at the Xinxiong shoe factory in
Dongguan City, Guangdong Prov-
ince, struck for two days to protest
management’s unilateral change in
their work shift schedule. Workers’
pay averaged $14 for their six-day,
ten-hours-per-day workweek.
Chinese labor law requires time-and-
a-half pay for overtime, double pay
for weekends, and triple pay for
holiday work. The company elimi-
nated the Saturday ten-hour shift at
this legally mandated double salary
and forced workers into weekday 12-
hour shifts with all overtime paid at
time-and-a-half. The company main-
tained a 60-hour workweek, but
shoved it into five 12-hour days
instead of six ten-hour days. Workers
still worked a 60-hour week with 20
hours overtime per week, but now 
all hours were paid at time-and-a-
half rather than ten hours at time-
and-a-half and ten hours at double
time. They effectively lost five hours’
pay per week from their already rock-
bottom salaries. Besides having an
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impact on pay, the extension of the
workday from ten to 12 hours greatly
increased job safety hazards. Repeated
studies have shown that workers tire,
lose concentration, and suffer acci-
dents at much higher rates during
longer work shifts.
An official from the local township
government told China Labour Bul-
letin that “the strike was an almost
inevitable outbreak of collective
anger against the management.” A
mid-level manager acknowledged
that “the majority of workers there,
despite national regulations to the
contrary, were being denied pensions
and medical insurance.”
The strike ended with the arrest and
detention of ten workers.47
On Strike . . . To Bed
An account published in a Chinese
weekly newspaper suggests the
frequency of strikes and their mixed
results. Unusual tactics arise, too, such
as striking workers returning to their
dormitories to sleep, instead of setting
up picket lines. A reporter for China’s
Phoenix Weekly newspaper interviewed
He Jun in 2004, describing him as “a
typical Pearl River Delta migrant
worker.” Here are portions of the
news story, as translated by New
York-based China Labor Watch:48
“The problems He Jun described
correspond to a portion of factories in
the County. He originally worked at
Shatangs Suncheng Shoe Company
Ltd., in Dongguan City. Over the
course of the two years he worked
there, the normal work schedule was
eight hours a day, but if they had to,
workers at the Suncheng factory
would work more, often 15 hours a
day. The longest overtime shift He
Jun worked was from seven in the
morning until past two in the after-
noon the next day. After working
continuously for 31 hours, everyone
collapsed. He Jun also once worked
for three months without a single
day off. His overtime wages were far
below the labor laws standard.
“He Jun witnessed 15 strikes. He said
that strikes weren’t started casually.
Usually workers in the sewing and
shoe shaping departments began
strikes. The employees in the two
workplaces, as the departments were
called, felt that they earned too little
money for too much work, so they
would stop working and go to sleep
in their dormitories. The two work-
places were the most crucial depart-
ments in the factory; once workers
went on strike there, all production in
the factory had to stop for a period.
“The boss could not replace striking
workers immediately, so sometimes
he would raise the workers’ wages.
The moment the boss said he would
raise wages, the workers would very
happily return to work. However,
this kind of promise was rarely
fulfilled, He Jun said. The next time
there was a strike, the boss would
cheat them again; it was like acting
in a play.
“After strikes, the boss would often
only raise the wages of overseers,
foremen, and workplace directors.
Some of those who benefited from
these raises would not lead strikes
again. Young migrant men and
women from the countryside dared
not and were not able to protect
their own rights, so the boss did not
even need to trick them.
“No one came to help us, He Jun
said. The factory would keep
workers’ deposits and delay paying
wages in order to prevent employ-
ees from leaving the factory. When
there were injuries or sicknesses, the
workers’ helplessness and weakness
would be even more obvious.”
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China has ratified ILOConvention 100 on equal payfor women and men doing
equal work or work of equal value. It
has not ratified Convention 111, the
ILO’s general non-discrimination
instrument, which bars discrimina-
tion based on race, color, sex, religion,
political opinion, national extraction,
or social origin. Whether ratified or
not, however, both of these conven-
tions are among those cited as “core”
in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, and member countries are
bound to uphold their principles.
Discrimination Against
Women Workers 
China has ratified the UN Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Both 
international human rights instru-
ments obligate governments to take
all measures in their power to elimi-
nate discrimination against women.
The Chinese constitution guarantees
women equal rights with men in all
spheres of life, promises to protect
the rights and interests of women,
and applies the principle of equal pay
for equal work. China’s labor laws
and regulations generally require
equal pay and equality of treatment
for women workers.
But law and reality often conflict.
The Law on Women’s Rights and
Interests contains many restrictions
on jobs, working hours, and working
conditions for women that effectively
deny them employment opportunities
and equality in employment. For
example, the law prohibits discrimi-
nation against women in employ-
ment. It also requires protecting
women from working in unspecified
dangerous occupations. Employers
therefore use the law to exclude
women or to lower their wages.
According to a national survey,
people involved with women’s legal
issues believe that the three major
problems with the legal system are
unclear laws, unclear enforcement
authority, and laws that are practically
impossible to execute or enforce.1
In addition, women’s traditional—
and commonly considered primary—
role as caregivers leads employers to
avoid hiring women and to get rid of
women workers for being supposedly
less flexible and less adaptable to
workplace needs. A researcher at
Beijing University Law School said,
“There’s a saying: Girls are like water
in a basin. After a while, you pour it
out. This attitude is reflected in every
aspect of life. Women are the first to
be laid off. Women have the hardest
time getting justice in this society.
Women are the first to be taken ad-
vantage of.” The main problem here is
the failure to implement the law.2
China’s turn to capitalism and
export-led development has had
profound effects on women workers,
creating both opportunities and new
forms of discrimination. Several
decades ago, the only fate available to
young women was to wait to be
married off by their parents, without
any hope of seeing a world outside
their villages. But as migration is
occurring around the establishment
of export processing zones across the
globe, young women in massive
C H A P T E R  3
Discrimination in the Workplace
38
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 3
Discrimination in the Workplace
numbers have moved from rural
areas in the interior of the country
to low-wage, labor-intensive, private
investor owned manufacturing
plants in the south and eastern
coastal regions. In theory, this
historical development could help
these young women achieve econo-
mic independence and provide them
with a greater range of life choices.
In reality, however, this is not the
predominant outcome.
In the 2000 census, women com-
prised 60 percent of the more than
10 million migrant laborers in
Guangdong Province. In 2003, some
70 percent of the 5.5 million
migrant workers in the Shenzhen
special economic zone were women.
In Shenzhen’s industrial district of
Nanshan, 80 percent of the half-
million workers were women; their
average age was 23.3
Young women workers are often
locked into exploitation in these
factory zones, because the situation
in their rural homes is even bleaker.
Speaking of her work in a pantyhose
factory in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Prov-
ince, a young woman worker told an
interviewer, “The hardship working
in that shop is hardly imaginable for
those who have not been there. You
get up and work until dark. Not a
single minute to sit down and rest.”
When this worker left the factory
after one year to return to her village
in Anhui Province to marry, the
owner failed to pay her 2,000 Rmb
($260) in withheld wages. With-
holding wages is part of an employ-
ment bonding system designed to
keep workers on the job for at least 
a year.
After getting married and having a
child, the worker returned to the same
factory job in Wenzhou. Asked why,
she replied, “We are in despair staying
in our village. The farm village is very
poor. We all live in poverty.” She
later quit the factory again, and again
failed to obtain her deferred salary.
This time she stayed in Wenzhou
and took work as a restaurant server,
then as a beautician.
Many of these female migrant
workers—called dagongmei—work
without contracts in private firms
rife with abusive treatment and labor
law violations. They often work 60 to
70 hours a week with no overtime
pay. Many are packed into dormito-
ries next to the factories, sleeping six
or eight or even more than a dozen
in a small room, cooking over a small
gas hot plate, and rarely leaving the
premises. Working conditions are
hazardous in many garment, elec-
tronics, shoe, and toy factories, with
widespread use of toxic chemicals
such as benzene, chromium, and
vinyl chloride. In one case, 28 young
women workers in a Taiwanese-
owned shoe factory in Dongguan
suffered toxic poisoning and nerve
damage that led to loss of muscle
control and partial paralysis.4
Older women workers in state-owned
enterprises have been front-line
victims of other types of discrim-
ination as these firms are restructured
into smaller private companies to
compete in the global marketplace.
Government regulations tacitly
encourage SOEs to lay off women
workers first, before male workers.
(Although the law does not permit
such discrimination, many local
regulations state that the “main
bread earners” in families should be
given priority in keeping their jobs.)
In this way, women are often doubly
discriminated against—by both sex
and age—as many are forced into an
early retirement that yields much
smaller pensions. A 2002 study by the
World Bank detailed some of the
many challenges to women’s equality
in China:5
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“As in many other countries, China
is having some difficulty moni-
toring and enforcing its own Labor
Law, especially in the private
sector—let alone the informal
sector. State affirmative action
policies have receded while tradi-
tional gender stereotypes and
values have re-emerged, including
increasing gender discrimination in
the labor market. Women are often
employed in lower status, lower
paid jobs. During the transition,
women have had a harder time
than men obtaining and keeping
jobs. . . . Women appear to be dis-
proportionately represented among
laid-off workers, suffer from higher
unemployment rate and have
greater difficulty finding alternate
employment.”
Discrimination in Hiring
Discrimination in hiring is an open
practice in China. The 2002 World
Bank study reported, “Job advertise-
ments often specify applicants
should be male, or young, attractive
women, although such job discrimi-
nation flouts the 1992 Women’s
Law.” Employers’ job advertisements
commonly say “only male,” “men
preferred,” “25 years or younger,”
and sometimes even stipulate girls
who are “good-looking” and “taller
than 150 centimeters.” The World
Bank found “evidence that even
government departments, which
would be expected to uphold non-
discrimination clauses of the Labor
Law, have openly discouraged
female university graduates from
applying for employment at recruit-
ment fairs.” In a September 2002
survey of 1,100 women conducted
by the Jiangsu Women’s Federation,
80 percent of respondents said that
they had encountered discrimination
in the job-seeking process.6
When Li Riping, a new graduate of
Chinese People’s University, joined
the crush of college seniors looking
for jobs, she knew the rules: “If a
woman and a man apply at the same
time for a job, they’ll consider the
man; they won’t talk to [a] woman.”
In November 2002, the Beijing labor
bureau wanted to hold a job fair for
women to solve the difficulties that
female college seniors and master’s
degree holders face. The bureau
sought participation from 500 compa-
nies in Beijing, including many multi-
national firms, but only five replied.7
At another 2002 fair in Beijing open
to men and women job seekers, 117
of 264 employers indicated that they
considered only men. Tan Lin, a
professor at the Institute of Demog-
raphy and Development, Nan Kai
University, said that half of the
companies that recruited at Nan Kai
wanted to hire only males. The
university had to ask them to con-
sider some female graduates after
providing them all the documents for
males. A Chinese People’s University
professor said that he would not
admit any female graduate students,
because helping them to find a job
after graduation was really a head-
ache to him.8
Sexual discrimination in employment
is so serious that many women feel
compelled to take extreme measures
to get a job. Zhang Jing, an “ugly-
looking” girl in Tianjin, considered
facial surgery because she was reject-
ed by hundreds of employers. Miss
Wang, a university senior in Shang-
hai, disguised herself as a man to
attend job fairs. Some graduating
students have felt that they needed to
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“If a woman and a man apply at the same time for a job, they’ll
consider the man,” says recent university graduate Li Ripeng.
“They won’t talk to a woman.”
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have sexually provocative pictures
taken and wear sexually alluring
clothes to attract recruiters.9
Discrimination in Layoffs
Women in China find themselves not
only last hired but also first fired. The
World Bank found that “women have
borne a disproportionate share of the
layoffs, especially early on during the
restructuring of the SOEs, since the
sectors targeted for retrenchment
were those where women formed the
majority of the workforce.”10
The Ministry of Labor and Social
Security reported that in 1997,
while women accounted for only 39
percent of China’s workforce, they
made up nearly 61 percent of its
laid-off workers. In the large-scale
shutdowns, shrinking, and sell-offs
of SOEs that began in the mid-
1990s, women workers were laid off
at much higher rates than men.
According to a 1999 investigation of
more than 4 million laid-off workers
in Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu,
Heilongjiang, and Anhui, 60 to 80
percent of the laid-off workers were
female. A 2002 study in Beijing,
Tianjin, Nanjing, Xi’an, Chang-
chun, and Wuhan found that 57
percent of laid-off workers were
female. Official figures show that
some 75 percent of laid-off women,
compared with only 50 percent of
men, were still unemployed after
one year.11
In a 1998 interview, a female laid-off
worker attending an unemployment
center in Tianjin told the New York
Times, “At our factory everyone who
was laid off was a woman. Look
around you, everyone here is female.
Now what we can do? We’re not
young enough. We do not have expe-
rience.” “The training programs they
offer have reinforced stereotypes
about women’s work and skills,”
added Ching Kwan Lee, a sociologist
at the City University of Hong Kong.
“Beautician, seamstress, domestic
helper, child care.”12
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 3
n JUSTICE FOR ALL n CHINA
42
Retirement Age Discrimination
In China, men retire at 60, and
women retire at 55. The discrepancy
is ostensibly meant to protect women’s
interests, but critics say that the
policy discriminates against women.13
Analyst Zhang Lu found that the
retirement age discrepancy causes
women to receive substantially
smaller pensions than men, further
reducing women’s financial status.
The discrepancy also induces enter-
prises to lay off women first. In many
failing SOEs, women are forced to
retire in their middle thirties to
forties and wait for a tiny pension,
instead of being laid off and receiv-
ing unemployment benefits.
The early retirement age for women
also causes more “glass ceiling” prob-
lems for women’s career develop-
ment. Because women retire at age
55, a company considers only women
younger than 45 for advancement.
Thus, 45-year-old women at the
height of their talent and energy 
lose the chance to be promoted to
higher ranks.14
Unequal Pay and 
Occupational Segregation
As in many countries, some employ-
ment sectors in China are seen as
suitable only for women. These jobs
include repetitive unskilled work in
manufacturing; domestic work, clean-
ing, and other service industries; and
“female” occupations such as primary
school teaching. In contrast with
recruitment literature seeking “only
males” or “males preferred” for grad-
uate level jobs, advertisements for
low-paid and unskilled jobs in
Guangzhou and Shenzhen factories
express preference for young, nimble-
fingered, and expendable females.15
Both the All China Women’s Fed-
eration and the ACFTU perpetuate
the myth that women are best suited
for such jobs through their training
courses for unemployed women,
which deal mainly with beauty treat-
ment, dressmaking, and housekeeping.
This job segregation explains much of
the wage gap between women and
men. According to a study by Xin
Meng of the Australian National
University, gender wage discrimina-
tion accounts for 73 percent of the
total gender wage gap in China.16
Data from the Chinese Bureau of
Statistics show that the wage gap
between women and men increased
7.4 percent between 1990 and 2000.
In 2003, 19.8 percent of women
workers, but only 11.6 percent of
men, earned less than 500 Rmb ($65)
per month. In contrast, 6.6 percent of
women workers and 12.6 percent of
men earned more than 2,000 Rmb
($260). Among workers earning more
than 5,000 Rmb ($650) per month,
14.4 percent were female and 85.6
percent were male.17
Sexual Harassment
Studies show that 84 percent of
Chinese women suffer some form of
sexual harassment. Half of these inci-
dents are employment related. These
studies also show that 72 percent of
workplace sexual harassment inci-
dents are committed by supervisors
and 28 percent by colleagues.18
Because China has no law that
explicitly defines and prohibits sexual
harassment, obtaining evidence to file
claims is very difficult. Without laws
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In contrast with recruitment literature seeking “only males” or “males
preferred” for graduate level jobs, advertisements for low-paid and
unskilled jobs in Guangzhou and Shenzhen factories express 
preference for young, nimble-fingered, and expendable females.
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to protect them, women workers
who suffer harassment choose either
to leave the company or to swallow
the insults and humiliations. Social
pressures and the tendency to “blame
the victim” in harassment cases also
prevent women from speaking out.
In a 2004 article, Beijing Youth Daily
columnist An Dun wrote that most
of the women whom she inter-
viewed had been sexually harassed
on the job. Interviewee Liu Jia said
that she resigned after she could not
bear any more of her bosses’ sexual
touching and forced kisses. But
when she resigned, the company
refused to pay her that month’s
salary because she had not given
them a month’s notice. Li Mingli
and her husband divorced because of
her boss’s continual midnight calls.
After the divorce, Li left her job and
opened her own flower shop. She
said that she did not want to work
for companies any more because
sexual harassment is so common in
the workplace.19
Discrimination Against 
Pregnant Women 
According to Chinese labor law,
particularly the Law on the Pro-
tection of Rights and Interests of
Women, employers are prohibited
from terminating women employees
during pregnancy, maternity leave,
and breast-feeding of babies under
one year old. However, according to
Zhang Zheng, an official from the
Xicheng Labor Dispute Arbitration
Center in Beijing, the laws are not
consistently enforced. In 2002, this
small center alone received some 80
cases involving violations of these
rights, and the number is rising.20
Contrary to law, some employment
contracts state that during mater-
nity leave workers will not be paid
and the employer will not cover
their medical expenses. A recent
survey conducted by Xinhua and
Beijing municipal labor authorities
found that some 10 percent of
employers do not respect labor law
requirements for women workers’
employment contracts. Zhou
Fenzhi, a postal worker in a Hunan
Province, was fired after taking
maternity leave.21
Many companies demand that
women sign contracts stating that
for a specified number of years,
they are not allowed to bear chil-
dren or they will be fired. At one
telecommunications company,
women workers are forced to sign a
contract indicating, “I pledge that
for the duration of this contract, I
will not become pregnant. If I am
pregnant, I will be terminated as a
voluntary resignation.” 22 Many
employers even demand that female
applicants provide certificates of
their single status as a precondition
of employment.
Although there are serious gaps in
enforcement, some observers believe
that China’s enforcement of women’s
legal right to be paid pregnancy and
maternity benefits is more effective
than that of any other labor law
provision. However, selective or
partial enforcement of these norms,
or enforcement in the absence of
concrete laws on gender discrimina-
tion, can actually exacerbate other
forms of discrimination. For example,
if only the pregnancy-related laws are
enforced, employers are encouraged
to discriminate against women of
childbearing age in order to avoid the
cost of such benefits.
Forced Searches
The ACFTU’s 2004 annual report
described serious violations of
women’s physical integrity in some
non-SOEs. Some employers have
imposed strict disciplinary regula-
tions aimed at women workers. If
women employees violate the poli-
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cies, they are insulted, searched, and
beaten. A female cleaner in Shang-
hai attempted suicide after being
forced to undress when the super-
visor at her workplace claimed that
he had lost 1,000 Rmb ($130) and
suspected her of the theft. At a wig-
making factory in Shenzhen, a
Korean employer, suspicious that
some women workers had stolen a
wig, searched 56 of them and made
them stand still for one hour with
their arms on their heads.23
On August 6, 2002, supervisors at a
diamond factory in Zonghua City,
Guangzhou Province, arbitrarily
undressed some 80 female and ten
male workers to check for stolen
diamonds when one employee lost a
pack of four diamonds. Workers were
forced to sign an agreement that
allowed the factory supervisors to
search their belongings and bodies.
Even menstruating women were
made to remove all their clothes.
“They forced us to strip off clothes
and checked us,” said one woman.
“This is illegal, infringing our rights.
We are working here, but were
stripped off to check. If it spreads to
our hometown, how shall we meet
people there? This case has created
huge mental hurt for us.”24
Discrimination Based on
Social Origin: China’s
Migrant Workers 
Article 2 of the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
prohibits discrimination on the basis
of social origin. So does the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. China has ratified
the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, committing itself to guar-
antee those rights “without discrimi-
nation of any kind as to . . . social
origin . . . or other status.”
Although China has not ratified
Convention 111, it is bound, like all
member countries, by the conven-
tion’s principles related to “equality
of opportunity and treatment in
respect of employment and occupa-
tion, with a view to eliminating any
discrimination in respect thereof.”
The convention defines discrimina-
tion as “any distinction, exclusion or
preference made on the basis of race,
colour, sex, religion, political opinion,
national extraction or social origin,
which has the effect of nullifying or
impairing equality of opportunity or
treatment in employment or occupa-
tion” [emphasis added].
Migrant workers have powered
much of China’s export growth and
construction industries. As part of
the government’s market-oriented
economic development strategy, 150
to 200 million rural peasants have
moved from the countryside to
urban centers in the past decade. The
rural-to-urban flow is most intense
in Beijing, in the coastal industrial
areas (in the SEZs) around Shanghai
and Guangdong province near Hong
Kong, and in Fujian Province across
from Taiwan. In the past quarter-
century, Guangdong’s Pearl River
Delta region has grown from an area
of mostly farming villages into a
massive manufacturing center with a
population of 50 million people.
Pearl River Delta factories account
for one-third of China’s foreign
trade. As one analyst notes, “The
number of Chinese who have left
farms and now trawl the cities for
work probably exceeds the entire
workforce of the United States.”25
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for work probably exceeds the entire workforce of the United States.
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Migrant worker movement into
SEZs is only part of the broader
transformation of the labor market
in China and the transfer of surplus
agricultural labor from countryside
to city. Millions of migrant workers
also labor in the construction sector,
fueling the rapid pace and high vol-
ume of new building and transport
construction. Others have gone into
the mining industry, the world’s
largest, where illegal private mines
now exist.
Hukou System
Chinese migrants’ living and work-
ing conditions are similar to those
of many migrant workers who move
from poor to developed countries.
The difference in China is that this
discrimination based on social
origin is codified and applies to
workers migrating inside their own
country. As in other countries,
Chinese migrant workers com-
monly receive below minimum
wage pay, put in above maximum
hours of work, and confront illegal
workplace hazards and sexual
harassment, among other violations
of their rights. Migrant coal miners
in China now face the deadliest
mine working conditions in the
world. Official figures cite 5,000 to
10,000 coal miner deaths per year,
and unofficial estimates are as high
as 40,000.26
Many city dwellers derisively call
China’s migrant peasant workers
Mang Liu. This term, which literally
means “drifting” or “wandering
without direction,” was applied from
the late 1950s to the early 1990s to
the millions of peasants who moved
about the country illegally looking
for food or jobs. Today, these migrant
workers labor in cities and factories
far from their rural homes, but they
carry permanent agricultural worker
status under the system of house-
hold registration called hukou. In
China, a person’s social status is
largely decided by hukou and
whether it is agricultural hukou
or non-agricultural, urban hukou.
The hukou system is a creation of
government policy going back to
1953. Although migration was
severely restricted in 1956, the real
implementation of the hukou system
began in 1958, the year of the Great
Leap Forward. Ostensibly, the hukou
system was a grain-rationing arrange-
ment. But the government’s main
goal was to tie the peasants to the
land, thereby keeping city growth
under control. The system implicitly
supported heavy industrialization
over the more labor-intensive light
industries, and it favored urban
dwellers by maintaining a cheap,
steady food supply line to the cities.
Hukou status is inherited. The chil-
dren of peasants can change to urban
hukou status only by going to univer-
sity or sometimes by entering the
army and being promoted to an
officer’s rank. On the theory (and it 
is only a theory, not borne out in
practice) that their life on the land
guarantees security, peasants are not
entitled to pensions, health insurance,
and other social welfare benefits re-
served for urban hukou holders.
Those who have migrated to cities
still hold peasant status, performing
urban workers’ jobs without enjoying
urban workers’ benefits linked to
urban hukou status. This type of
regulatory discrimination is felt
most by married workers with fami-
lies, who are the most likely to need
the benefits reserved for legal resi-
dents, such as public education and
health insurance.
Local officials maintain limits on
migrant workers’ employment
opportunities. In 1998, for example,
Beijing adopted prohibitions on
migrants working in finance, insur-
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ance, management, accounting, and
sales and in jobs as cashiers, tele-
phone operators, taxi drivers, airline
crew members, and wait staff in
tourist hotels.
Permits, Documents, and
Freedom of Movement
Under China’s hukou system, mi-
grants must obtain a departure
permit to leave their home, a resi-
dence permit to live in a new city,
and a work permit for employment.
Like foreign guest workers, China’s
migrant workers are often forbidden
to bring family members with them.
Migrant workers’ entry and work in
fast growing industrial areas like the
Shenzhen and Zhuhai SEZs in the
Pearl River Delta near Hong Kong
are particularly monitored and
controlled. Workers often have to pay
high fees to government officials to
obtain their various permits. Many
officials in urban receiving cities
demand payments for more permits
and identification documents, such as
proof of unmarried status, proof of
birth within China’s one-child policy,
proof of good health, proof that their
landlord holds urban hukou, and other
papers.27 Some impose fees of 400
Rmb (about $50)—equal to a month’s
wages for most migrant workers.
Migrant workers lack freedom of
movement when employers take
and hold their papers, which they
must have on their person at all
times if they venture into the sur-
rounding community. Not having
permits to show police or other
authorities, who can demand to see
documents at any time, can mean
immediate expulsion back to the
countryside—or worse. In January
2003, five rural workers without
papers who were loaded onto a
truck in a sweep by the Security
Team of the Qingfengju Neigh-
borhood Committee of Baiyun
district in Guangzhou fell out onto
the road as the truck sped out of
town. Three were killed.28
In March 2003, Sun Zhigang, a
college-educated 27-year-old fashion
designer who had traveled to Guang-
zhou in search of work, forgot to take
his permit with him when he went
out on the street. Police apprehended
him and sent him to a migrant
worker detention center. Three days
later, he was pronounced dead. An
autopsy revealed that Sun had been
brutally beaten to death while in
police custody.29
The incident provoked national
outrage. As a result, the State
Council ordered the whole nation to
stop the practice of arresting and
sending away “drifters.” 30 Several
cities, including Shenyang in Liao-
ning Province, revoked the tempo-
rary permit system. But it remains
intact in areas with large numbers 
of migrant workers.
Exclusion from Social Benefits
On the basis of their rural hukou
status, migrant workers are not
eligible for social insurance and
social benefits—including health
care, housing allowances, food
subsidies, and education assis-
tance—that local residents enjoy.
Residency permits for migrants do
not allow free choice of housing.
Unable to afford their own lodging,
many migrant workers are forced by
circumstance into dormitory-style,
company-owned quarters, with rent
and meal expenses deducted from
their paychecks. For many workers,
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Under China’s hukou system, migrants must obtain a departure
permit to leave their home, a residence permit to live in a new city,
and a work permit for employment.
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the sheer volume of mandatory
overtime hours makes it impossible
for them to do more than return to
the dormitories to eat and sleep.
To obtain a job, migrants sometimes
must pay a deposit amounting to
several months’ wages and repayable
only if they remain on the job for a
long period. In addition to such
bond payments, many employers
withhold migrant workers’ wages to
ensure that they remain at work.
Workers forfeit the bonds and
deferred wages if they leave the job
before a specified time, usually not
less than one year. However, com-
pleting the cycle of exploitation,
many employers pocket the money
when workers leave the job even if
they stay the requisite length of
time, knowing that migrant workers
rarely have the time or money to
take legal action to regain lost pay.
Migrant workers also may face ob-
stacles to placing their children in
public schools (see Chapter 4 on
Child Labor). A 2004 report by the
Congressional-Executive Com-
mission on China (CECC) states:31
“Many city governments see migrant
children as an unwelcome and
expensive nuisance, and therefore
simply forbid them from attending
public schools, or charge their
parents substantial additional fees.
Over 80 percent of migrant chil-
dren pay more than their urban
counterparts to attend school.
Private schools for migrants often
find themselves in conflict with
local governments and residents
seeking to close them.”
Ironically, migrant workers may
suffer discrimination not only in the
urban centers where they move to
find work, but also in their home
villages. The CECC report notes
that a large number of legal cases
have been filed in Shaanxi Province
over the property rights of people
who have left their village either
temporarily or permanently (for
example, migrants in search of work
or women who marry outside their
villages). In these types of cases,
when the village distributes funds
from collective assets, such as com-
pensation for the government’s
requisition of village-owned land,
the villagers may consider migrant
workers to be outsiders and deny
them their share.32
Minimum Wage, Working Hours,
and Effective Wages
China’s national law provides that
minimum wages are to be set at
regional and local levels on the basis
of six considerations:
n Average local living expenses 
n Social security and housing
investment paid by individuals
n Average wage
n Unemployment rate
n Local economic development
n Other variables
These factors allow ample leeway 
for provinces, counties, and cities 
to modify their minimum wages,
including the latitude to lower them.33
Some analysts believe that this policy
generates migration to the regions
with the best wages, pointing to the
pull of migrant workers to the eastern
seaboard or the race of Shandong
migrants to the south to avoid the
northeast. But the higher jurisdic-
tion’s minimum wage is actually not a
wage floor, but a ceiling. A province’s
minimum wage, for example, does
not prevent a county or city in the
province from setting a lower mini-
mum. This reasoning turns the basic
idea of a minimum wage on its head,
provoking yet another type of “race to
the bottom” among different pro-
vinces, counties, and cities to reduce
wages in order to attract investors.
Many analysts suggest that the so-
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called minimum wage is really a
maximum wage. One study notes:34
“The very large difference in wages
between regions in China effec-
tively pits them against each other
to attract investment and new
industry. . . . For example, the
minimum wage of a city near
Guangzhou is Rmb 300 [about
$39], which is much less than the
provincial government’s recently
adjusted standard in Guangzhou of
Rmb 480 [about $63]. This creates
an incentive for a foreign enterprise
to abandon Guangzhou and move
to the [low-wage] city to build a
factory and continue its business.
. . . Pressuring minimum wages
downward happens in various
regions across the country, not only
in the Pearl River Delta. . . . Frankly,
none of the regional governments
will admit . . . that they do it. . . .
The so-called minimum wage has
become a maximum wage.”
Many migrant workers are also
forced to work excessive overtime
hours. China’s labor law specifies a
normal workday of eight hours and a
workweek of 40 hours. The legal
maximum overtime limits are three
hours per day, 36 hours per month,
and 432 hours per year. But loop-
holes in the law create exceptions
based on waivers by local authorities,
“special circumstances,” the “special
nature” of a company’s production
processes, and other spurious factors.
Companies use these loopholes to
force workers to perform massive
overtime labor under threat of dis-
missals or wage penalties.35 A survey
conducted by the Guangdong labor
department found that 85 percent of
the 26 million migrant workers in
the province work 10 to 14 hours
per day and that half work seven
days per week.36
Unfortunately, workers do not nec-
essarily receive overtime pay for
their extended hours. The official
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minimum wage ranges from approx-
imately 300 to 600 Rmb per month
($36 to $72 per month or 21 to 42
cents per hour, based on a standard
40-hour day and five-day week),
depending on regional differentials,
with higher minimums in urban
centers. Even at the $72 minimum
wage, workers putting in more com-
mon 12-hour days with unpaid over-
time, on a five-day-per-week basis,
or 260 hours per month, would see
their actual pay reduced to 28 cents
per hour.
One survey found, however, that “it
is common for workers in export
factories to work up to a total of 360
hours per month, the equivalent of
11.5 hours per day, every day of the
month.” Even applied to the highest
minimum wage of $72 for a standard
workweek, a 360-hour month with
unpaid overtime amounts to 20 cents
per hour pay, lower than the lowest
minimum wage. Moreover, employers
may doubly penalize workers by forc-
ing them to “rework” flawed produc-
tion pieces—the workers are not paid
at the regular piecework rate for work
performed, plus they are not paid for
the overtime hours required to
rework the pieces. Analysts Peter
Alexander and Anita Chan summa-
rize the situation: 37
“[T]he wages cited for China do 
not reflect the hourly wage in
Chinese factories, as employers
make the workers labour for illegally
long hours—up to 70 hours a
week—to obtain the monthly legal
minimum wage. When these addi-
tional hours are taken into account,
wages in China are lower than else-
where in the region, often lower
even than those in Cambodia and
Vietnam, two countries that are
poorer than China. The funda-
mental cause, we think, is China’s
household registration [hukou]
system, which is central to the
maintenance of cheap migrant
labour.”
SARS and Migrant Workers
In 2003, migrant workers also bore
the brunt of the economic impact
from Severe Atypical Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS). For quarantined
workers who were barely earning
poverty level wages, periods of
forced, unpaid unemployment
caused a precipitous drop in family
income. The crackdown on SARS
at construction sites, coupled with a
temporary ban in Beijing on all
non-essential decorating work, left
thousands of workers laid off or
temporarily unemployed.38
In addition, the SARS crisis exacer-
bated negative attitudes toward mi-
grant workers, partly because Chinese
citizens mistrusted outsiders, but also
because government policies targeted
the migrant and rural population as
being the main avenue for the poten-
tial spread of SARS. Increased restric-
tions on migrant travel, as well as
heightened surveillance and moni-
toring of migrant residences and
workplaces, encouraged many urban
residents to believe that migrants
carried the disease.39
Case Studies
Employers often violate migrant
worker rights with impunity. They
know that migrant workers are
unaware of their legal rights, unfa-
miliar with legal claims and proc-
esses, and fearful of losing their jobs.
“Most migrant workers don’t have
much education,” explained Ning
Jiaxin, a migrant worker advocate in
n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  n  
A recent survey found that it is common for workers in export
factories to work up to a total of 360 hours per month, the equiva-
lent of 11.5 hours per day, every day of the month.
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 3
50
n JUSTICE FOR ALL n CHINA
Tangxia. “They have no sense of the
law. They don’t know how to protect
themselves or where they should go
when they’re in trouble.” 40
Chinese researchers from the Beijing
Dajun Economic Observation and
Research Center conducted case
studies of migrant workers in several
SEZ factories. Published in 2004,
their interviews brought to life the
reality of the discrimination that
migrants face in the workplace.41
n A 32-year-old worker in a Tai-
wanese investor-owned garment
factory told researchers that he
works on average 13 hours per day.
The worker said that the company
seized and held his and other mi-
grant workers’ employment permits
to prevent them from leaving. The
employer told workers the permits
would be “lost” if they tried to
leave—meaning they could not find
other jobs. Asked why migrants did
not bring legal action against this
unlawful practice, the worker re-
plied that it was “useless” because
government agencies do not
enforce the law.
n A 24-year-old worker in a Tai-
wanese-owned plastics factory told
of working 12 hours a day, seven
days a week, in hot, exhausting
conditions that caused widespread
breathing disorders among work-
ers. The plant operated on a piece-
work pay system, giving each
worker a required daily production
quota that was impossible to meet
in eight hours. They had to work
overtime to meet their quota but
received no overtime pay. The
employer fined workers for late-
ness, carelessness, not following
instructions, poor quality, and
other supposed work rule viola-
tions, even though such monetary
fines against workers are illegal.
n A worker said that he had to bribe
managers and supervisors to get
jobs in export factories. He said
that a manager told him and 
co-workers openly, “The owner
doesn’t pay me enough, so where
can I get the extra money? From
you, the workers.”
n Young women workers in a Tai-
wanese-owned apparel factory
told researchers that they labor
from 7:30 a.m. to 11:30 p.m. to
complete their production quotas,
with no overtime pay. Asked why
they stay on the job, they replied
that their labor contract calls for
three years’ employment and the
employer would fine them if they
left early. Moreover, they said, the
company withholds two months’
pay per year as an additional em-
ployment bond to be forfeited if
workers leave early.
The press reported more examples
of migrant worker rights violations:
n Many migrant workers are hired
without a written employment con-
tract, in clear violation of Chinese
labor law. In Zhejian Province,
another center of SEZ factories
near Shanghai, a 2003 report from
the official Xinhua news agency
found nearly 2 million workers
employed without individual labor
contracts. In one factory center in
Wenzhou, 80 percent of employ-
ees had no contracts. Nearly all
were migrant workers.42
n Workers at Ningbo City factories
told reporters, “We have been
working here more than two years
and we don’t have the slightest
idea what an employment contract
looks like. Our wages, they depend
on how much the boss feels like
paying. . . . What can we do about
unpaid wages? Well, nothing.”43
n An apparel company in Chepo-
shi’ershe Industrial Area of Guang-
zhou City forced migrants to
work overtime. According to a
worker who had been employed at
the factory for four years, workers’
shifts went from 8:00 a.m. to noon,
then 1:30 to 6:00 p.m., then 7:00 to
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10:00 p.m., and often past mid-
night. The employer admitted that
she had not signed contracts with
more than 50 workers and said,
“Employees are allowed to have
one day to rest every month.”44
Death at Bainan
In 2002, 19-year-old migrant work-
er Li Chunmei, who was employed
at the Bainan Toy Factory in Song-
gang making stuffed animals for ex-
port to the United States, died after
completing a 16-hour shift with no
break. She had not had a day off for
two months, despite her repeated
requests to her manager. In the mid-
dle of the night, Li began coughing
up blood. Her alarmed dormitory
mates called an ambulance, but Li
died before it arrived.
A new term has entered Chinese for
the phenomenon: guolaosi, or “over-
work death.” A Washington Post
reporter wrote, “There has been
little research on what causes these
deaths, or how often they occur.
Local journalists say many of them
are never documented but estimate
that dozens die under such circum-
stances every year in the Pearl River
Delta area alone, the booming
manufacturing region north of
Hong Kong.” 45
Is the Hukou System Changing?
Some emerging signs suggest that
aspects of the hukou system are being
modified, albeit haltingly and with
local and regional differences. The
CECC 2004 annual report noted
that the Chinese government had
improved the general treatment of
migrants. One important step was
the 2003 abolition of the notorious
“Measures for the Custody and
Repatriation of Vagrant Beggars in
Cities.” That regulation had allowed
summary detention of migrant
workers without papers and had
given rise to widely publicized cases
of workers’ deaths during detention.
The report also cited the Hangzhou
Public Security Bureau’s elimination
of mass dragnet sweeps aimed at
rounding up migrants. In addition, a
new national identification card law
limits police ability to request iden-
tification in certain situations.46
Migrants can enter some occupations
formerly denied them, such as work
in hotels. In recent decrees and regu-
lations, higher levels of government
have ordered local officials to stop
charging extortionate fees for permits
and other documents that migrants
need in order to move and find work.
It is unclear how the new regulations
are being implemented or enforced.
In addition, some local schools have
been opened to children of migrant
workers, and in some cities and
counties, schools for migrant
workers’ children have been accred-
ited and given assistance. China
Labour Bulletin reports:47
“Xiamen in particular has been
praised by official Chinese media for
its handling of migrant schools and
its attempts to help such schools
register and improve standards. The
city government has reportedly set
aside three million Rmb [$390,000]
to raise the standards of migrant
schools by training teachers and
improving school facilities and safety
standards of the premises. Huang
Yang of the Xiamen Education
Bureau’s development and planning
department stated . . . ‘Our city
government leadership has recog-
nized that a large number of our
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Workers at Ningbo City factories told reporters, “We have been
working here more than two years and we don’t have the slightest
idea what an employment contract looks like.”
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migrant workers will eventually settle
down here. Their children’s educa-
tion will affect the quality of our
future residents.’ ”
In what the official press calls “experi-
ments,” some county governments
have taken steps to allow migrant
workers to obtain urban hukou status
in localities where they have lived and
worked for a long period. In Shen-
zhen, for example, a new regulation
allowed local residents with rural
status to change to urban residency
status up until October 31, 2004.
Peng Juan, a 34-year-old migrant
worker in Yancheng County, in the
inland province of Henan, received
urban hukou status from county
authorities. She also obtained a per-
manent job with social benefits at a
fast growing local factory after per-
forming “odd jobs” in the area for
four years.
“For me, it’s like a pie falling from
the sky,” said Peng. 48
While some experts believe that the
hukou system will continue to be
driven by China’s oversupply of labor,
others note that in today’s China the
labor supply is also in flux and varies
by region. A recent report issued by
China’s Labor and Social Security
Ministry noted the emergence of labor
shortages of 2.8 million workers—2
million alone in the Pearl River Delta
area—particularly of young female
workers in factories with low wages,
bad working conditions, and intense
labor. The report cites the causes of
the labor shortage as wage stagnation,
lack of protection of worker rights,
rapid increase in labor demand, and
economic transition issues.49
The Pearl River Delta’s falling repu-
tation among migrant workers is not
the only factor contributing to the
area’s labor shortage. Many coastal
factories are moving inland, not only
offering workers employment
opportunities closer to home, but
also improving the rural economy.
Some workers have chosen to stay in
their home villages to take advan-
tage of farm wages that have risen
15 to 40 percent during the past
year. In addition, the Yangtze Delta
region, which has attracted higher
technology, higher wage enterprises,
is increasingly attractive to migrant
workers and foreign investors alike.50
In response to the labor shortage,
Pearl River Delta area factories have
reluctantly begun to hire workers
over 30. A manager at Starlite Hold-
ings in Shenzhen, which makes
greeting cards for Hallmark as well
as packaging materials for Micro-
soft, Fisher-Price, and other well-
known brands, explained that it
would be hard to increase wages
since profit margins were already so
narrow. Large-scale companies such
as Hallmark, he said, can name their
price or look elsewhere for lower
cost production.51
Working conditions in the Dong-
guan part of the Pearl River Delta,
where companies are notorious for
violations of labor standards, are 
still miserable. The 50 workers
employed at the Daojiong Hequn
faux hair factory, for example, “share
two toilets, sleep eight to a closet-
sized room in bunk beds and are
forbidden to use radios or watch
television in their dorms in order 
to conserve electricity.”52
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Some plants in the area use deceitful
tactics to attract workers. An execu-
tive at a Shenzhen doll factory told 
a reporter that the company prom-
ised monthly wages of $100 if busi-
ness was good, even though it
actually intended to pay only half
that amount. Although most
workers left within weeks, the
factory would replace them by
tricking new arrivals.53
The Pearl River Delta situation
suggests that the conditions for
exploitation may be about to dimin-
ish. In other parts of China, however,
where new business has not replaced
closed SOEs, mass unemployment
continues to leave migrant workers
vulnerable to abuses of their rights.
Fourteen million are still laid off
from SOEs. Ninety-five million
migrants are seeking work. An esti-
mated 150 million surplus laborers
are in rural areas, and 10 million
workers per year enter the urban
employment market. Every day,
thousands of laid-off workers take to
the streets in protest.54
The CECC warns that although
national and local authorities are
reforming the hukou system, “some of
these measures are slowly shifting
the existing system into a set of offi-
cially recognized class divisions based
on wealth, with an urban underclass
composed of rural migrants.” The
commission cautions that many of
the reform measures “merely allow 
a limited number of relatively well
off rural hukou holders to obtain
urban residence status by demon-
strating they have a fixed place of
residence and a ‘relatively stable
source of support.’ ”55
These requirements are difficult for
low-income rural migrants to fulfill.
In Nanjing, for example, new 2004
regulations define “fixed place of
residence” as ownership of an apart-
ment or possession of one issued by
a work unit. In Hebei Province,
applicants for local hukou cannot live
in rented apartments. Both sets of
regulations define “relatively stable
source of income” in relation to
either a professional job or a job that
provides income above the govern-
ment-established minimum wage.
Such restrictions are common in
other hukou reforms as well.56
Millions of migrant workers remain
unregistered and cut off from social
services. Although the State Council’s
2003 regulations do not condition
legal aid on an applicant’s residence
status, the Chinese news media has
reported that fewer than 3 percent of
migrant applicants usually receive
legal aid. Local governments often do
not have sufficient financial resources
to extend these services to migrants.
But while some pilot medical projects
in western China exclude migrants on
the basis of cost, the more prosperous
southern municipalities have begun 
to allow rural hukou holders to buy
into government-run urban health
plans, and the local governments
sometimes subsidize the migrants’
portion of the cost.57
In spite of the central government’s
efforts at reform, says the CECC, the
hukou system continues to facilitate
discrimination “because it divides
Chinese society into clear categories
and provides a convenient method
for local authorities and residents 
to identify migrants.” China’s 20
million migrant children are espe-
cially affected. In some cases, the
2003 regulations that ordered urban
public schools to admit migrants
have backfired:58
“[C]entral government pressure on
local schools to admit migrant
students has led to the extortion of
additional fees. Sometimes such
pressure prompts even more creative
forms of discrimination. Facing
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central pressure to admit migrant
children to local public schools,
township governments in Ningbo
have responded by adopting a ‘sepa-
rate but equal’ policy. Local authori-
ties have designated one particular
public school as the ‘migrant’ school,
replaced the full-time teachers with
part-time instructors, and redirected
local government education subsidies
to the schools serving local students.”
Other analysts offer similar caveats on
reform. “Despite recent revisions to
the Hukou residency system which
underlies many of the problems facing
migrants and their children,” said
China Labour Bulletin in a recent
report, “there has been little impact
for the majority of migrants and it is
estimated that most of the changes
and relaxation in the residence permit
system will benefit the wealthy white
collar migrants working in larger
cities and not the vast numbers of
migrants working in unskilled manual
jobs.” Moreover, as in other countries
competing for foreign investment, the
Chinese government faces the chal-
lenge of confronting its own vested
interest in ignoring employer abuses
to maintain an investor-friendly envi-
ronment. Alexander and Chan put it
this way:59
“Will the household registration
[hukou] system collapse or be rescind-
ed in China in the foreseeable future?
We do not think it likely. The secu-
rity minister was emphatic in 2002
about the need to perpetuate the
system: it is ‘an important compo-
nent of our country’s administrative
system and will exist for a long time.
. . . The hukou will not be abolished,
not now and not in the future.’ ”
Expert opinions vary widely on
where the hukou system is headed.
But all agree that recent develop-
ments show a country in the midst of
chaotic change, driven by several
factors. Migrant workers, increasingly
frustrated by their ongoing poverty,
abusive working conditions, govern-
ment corruption, and broken social
contract, are beginning to try out
different ways of defending their
rights. In areas with labor shortages,
enterprises may improve conditions
to attract migrants. In addition, many
companies that need highly skilled
staff may be willing to improve work-
ing conditions to attract university
graduates. Some cities have enough
available jobs to absorb large numbers
of migrant workers.
Still, the future of hukou is not yet
known. As the sending provinces
develop their own industries, rural
residents may not leave their homes
in the same numbers as in the past,
but this factor alone will not end
discrimination against migrant work-
ers. Local political/economic elites
established over the past couple of
decades have a huge economic stake
in keeping salaries low, since some 
of them own portions of the factories
and receive profits from them. More-
over, because the central government’s
authority over local governments is
weak, the impact of its efforts to
improve circumstances for migrant
workers will continue to be uneven.
Further, migrant workers will not
easily overcome decades of prejudice
from urban dwellers.
The Chinese government’s own in-
grained harsh approach to the hukou
issue has not yet disappeared. Witness
the July 2004 arrest of Wang Feiling,
a Chinese-born U.S. researcher who
was studying the household registra-
tion system in Shanghai. Accusing
Wang of spying and possessing state
secrets, authorities seized the Anhui
Province native, now a Georgia
Institute of Technology professor
with a master’s degree from Beijing
University and a doctorate from the
University of Pennsylvania. Shanghai
police held Wang in solitary confine-
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ment for four days and in detention
for two weeks before releasing him,
expelling him, and barring him from
returning to China. “My two-week
nightmare in Shanghai is not only
persecution for my academic work . . .
and punishment for my non-coopera-
tion with the Shanghai state security
police, but also part of a pattern of
security police activities that must be
curbed,” Wang said upon his release.60
Incidents like these clearly indicate
that fundamental reform of the hukou
system still faces significant obstacles.
The CECC notes:
“Guangzhou public security officials 
. . . continue to regard the residence
permit system as an indispensable
tool of social control, particularly of
migrants. Although the NPC is cur-
rently considering draft proposals for
a Law on the Protection of Peasant
Rights, similar legislation has been
under study for years without much
progress. Instead, Chinese leaders
have favored administrative pro-
nouncements to address the status of
Chinese migrants. As one Chinese
critic notes, ‘[Central government]
policy attention cannot completely
replace legal protection. Protecting
the interests of peasants requires
[that] the law give them correspon-
ding rights, rather than merely
letting peasants run around from
place to place seeking protection by
waving national “policy documents.”’
Unless the Chinese government af-
fords effective legal protections to
migrants and ends the social in-
equalities perpetuated by the hukou
system, discrimination against
migrants will continue to create
serious social problems.”61
The Chinese government’s goal of
maintaining social peace and political
control simultaneously is unrealistic
in a turbulent economic environment
rife with corruption and the abuse 
of those who are generating the
country’s wealth. Long-term change
can be secured only through the legal
protection and enforcement of
migrant workers’ rights.
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Child Labor
C H A P T E R  4
China has ratified ILOConvention 138 on theMinimum Age for Ad-
mission to Employment and ILO
Convention 182 on the Worst Forms
of Child Labor. China also has ratified
the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
ILO Convention 138 sets varying
ages for commencement of work by
young people. Age 16 is the standard
minimum for full-time work (age 18
for industrial or hazardous labor),
with carefully defined exceptions for
part-time work and for developing
countries. Convention 182 defines
“worst forms” of child labor as
bonded or other forced labor, child
labor in sex or drug trade, and “work
which, by its nature or the circum-
stances in which it is carried out, is
likely to harm the health, safety or
morals of children.”
China’s 1994 National Labor Law
and 2002 Regulations on Prohibiting
the Use of Child Labor forbid the
employment of children under 16 as
well as hazardous labor between 16
and 18. The law specifies administra-
tive review, fines, and revocation of
business licenses of establishments
that illegally hire minors.
The 2002 regulations introduced
more detailed civil and criminal
penalties for child labor violations.
Labor authorities can fine an institu-
tion or individual 5,000 Rmb ($650)
per month for each child laborer
employed. Employers who fail to
inspect ID cards and maintain per-
sonnel records are subject to a fine of
10,000 Rmb ($1,300). Certain viola-
tions, such as the death of a child,
carry criminal liability.
China’s laws and regulations impose
an affirmative duty on employers to
ensure that workers are at least 16
years old.1 In addition, they require
employers to maintain personnel
records. Institutions and individuals
have a legal right to report violations
of the regulations that prohibit child
labor. The ministries of Labor and
Social Security, Industry and Com-
merce, and Public Security share
responsibility for implementing and
enforcing the child labor laws.
In sum, China’s child labor laws and
regulations basically comply with
UN and ILO standards. Still, as in
every country, analysts must examine
the relationship between law and
practice and the effectiveness of labor
law enforcement to ascertain whether
international standards are respected.
Forward to the Past
Most analysts agree that child labor
was rampant in pre-revolutionary
China and that government policies
during the socialist period greatly
reduced it. The Chinese government
maintains that the country does not
have a widespread child labor prob-
lem and that the majority of children
who work do so at the behest of their
families, particularly in impoverished
rural areas, to supplement family
income. While very little empirical
data are available, lax enforcement by
provincial and local officials appears
to be widespread.2
However, the authoritarian political
culture makes child labor hard to
assess and document comprehen-
sively. As China Labour Bulletin
points out, “the practice has not been
eradicated and indeed appears to be
on the increase,” cautioning that “the
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extent of child labor remains difficult
to assess due to a lack of official
reporting on cases and the lack of
transparency in statistics in China
more generally . . . in the majority of
cases, the existence of child labor is
not discovered.” One study notes,
“[T]he availability of a large adult
migrant labor force, often willing to
work long hours for low wages, has
reduced the attractiveness of child
labor for employers.3
Nonetheless, some commentators
say, many child workers aged 12 to
15 migrate to the southern coast and
Guangdong, often with their parents,
and end up working in the special
economic zones, using false identity
papers. An investigation found that
“the numbers of children working in
export-oriented factories is difficult
to establish because both the workers
and the employers make efforts to
conceal their ages.” According to
Hong Kong news reports, instead of
acknowledging the lack of adequate
information, officials at the labor
ministry “claim that no government
figures are available because child
labor is not a problem in China.” 4
Even without official statistics,
however, ample reporting from
many sources is sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of a child labor
problem in China. According to
Chinese press reports, child labor
appears frequently in family busi-
nesses, where children, especially
girls, must participate in extensive
labor. These children often receive
no pay, since they are working for
their adult relatives. Businesses such
as restaurants and barbershops are
mostly owned by families and indi-
viduals, who frequently hire their
relatives to work. The People’s Daily
reported on December 20, 2002,
that a 15-year-old girl was working
full-time at her aunt’s barbershop
for 200 Rmb ($26) a month.5
A January 8, 2003, Workers Daily
investigation revealed that children
between the ages of 13 and 15 were
working in private businesses, mostly
in the service sector. In Kunming, for
example, reporters visited 20 work-
places and found 12 workers under
16. Reporters asked two girls, one 15,
the other 16, about their wages. The
girls said that they made the very low
wage of 350 Rmb (about $45) per
month, plus housing and meals.6
Children often work under abusive
conditions. An April 7, 2004, report
in the Life Daily, along with similar
reports in other papers, revealed that
the parents of many children, some
as young as nine, “rent” them to
flower sellers at a price of 300 Rmb
($39) per month. The children are
required to sell flowers for 14 hours
every day. They have strict sales
quotas. If they fail to meet their
quotas, their employers physically
abuse them.7
Child labor is also a problem in the
manufacturing sector. Researchers for
a China Central Television program
on child labor in Jiangxi Province
found hundreds of child workers in
enterprises of all types, along with the
existence of organized child labor
recruitment gangs. According to
some reports, the Zhejiang and
Fujian provinces, located in China’s
southeast region where foreign direct
investment is heavy, are also regions
with large numbers of child laborers,
many of them 13 or 14 years old. In
July 2003, Fujian provincial authori-
ties issued new child labor regula-
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Researchers for a television program on child labor in Jiangxi
Province found hundreds of child workers in enterprises of all types,
along with the existence of organized child labor recruitment gangs.
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tions after local authorities found
hundreds of children working in
coastal region factories.8
Many children get jobs in China’s
coastal regions by using fake, bor-
rowed, or stolen ID cards that falsify
their age. Many employers are pre-
pared to ignore the law to meet
production deadlines. When the
labor bureau in Nanhai City, Guang-
dong Province, looked into the
problem of the use of fake ID cards
to get work, it found that more than
80 percent of employers felt that
their job was to maintain production
and that fake ID cards were not their
concern, as long as production dead-
lines were met. One employer told the
Workers Daily, “For every piece pro-
duced by an adult worker, I have to
pay one dollar while I only have to
pay a child 70 cents. Children’s food
and lodging costs are also cheaper.”9
Although systematic, sector-by-
sector analysis is lacking, apparel,
footwear, and toy manufacturing
appear to be industries where chil-
dren work in large numbers. The
evidence, albeit anecdotal, is disturb-
ing. One news report brought home
the reality of child labor in an export
factory in Dongguan:10
“During the Chinese New Year cele-
brations, Cai Jie worked more than
14 hours a day, locked in a small
room with other teenage girls in a
factory where they glue the soles of
sneakers headed for store shelves in
the United States.
“ ‘They always make more work for
us over the holidays,’ said the 13-
year-old, who dropped out of school
a year ago to work in the factory.
‘It’s busy this time of year and the
managers don’t care.’
“Cai, who makes roughly 20 U.S.
cents an hour, said the hours are
long and the smell from the chemi-
cals in congested assembly rooms
makes some workers faint.
“ ‘Lots of girls get sick, from the
chemicals. When they get too sick
to work, the bosses send them home
without money,’ she said. ‘Last year,
there was a fire and some of the
workers died.’
“Many of the child workers come
from other provinces and live
under systems that prevent them
from leaving the factories and
shantytown complexes where they
live and work.
“A young woman from Anhui
Province, who did not wish to be
identified, claimed she assembles
Mattel-brand Barbie dolls at a large
factory in the city’s suburbs, for the
equivalent of $3 a day.
“ ‘We live at the factory, in very
cramped dormitories,’ said the 15-
year-old. ‘The managers are cruel
and tell us we’ll never see our fami-
lies unless we work harder. I don’t
like it very much.’ ”
Speaking to a U.S. journalist in
2002 on condition of anonymity,
an official with the provincial labor
bureau in Shenzhen explained that
factories hire children because they
can be paid less and worked much
harder than older, more experienced
workers, who are likely to complain
over low wages. “When government
officers or foreign business execu-
tives come to inspect the factories,
the managers are tipped off before-
hand, and underage workers are 
sent home,” he said. “It’s a game 
to them, when the bosses come to
check the factories they make every-
thing look good for the inspection.
But after they leave it’s back to 
business as usual.”11
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Education and Child Labor
China ranks nearly last in the world
in per capita expenditures for educa-
tion. While schooling is compulsory
and is supposed to be free for the first
nine years, the government has
reduced its subsidies to local schools.
In September 2003, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Edu-
cation visited China and reported its
failure to provide education to many
children of migrant workers. The
Special Rapporteur said that the
recent privatization of fees for public
education compels parents to pay
nearly half the costs of schooling,
often amounting to a month’s pay
each term, as well as additional costs
for books, uniforms, and other items.
Rising costs make education inacces-
sible to many children.12
Chinese experts concur that the main
cause of widespread child labor in
rural areas is the lack of funding for
education. Sometimes the central
government forces unfunded man-
dates on provincial budgets, and lo-
cal authorities make up the shortfall
by raising taxes for rural peasants.
Recently, the central government
ordered provincial authorities to
rescind some of those taxes, but local
governments are finding new ways to
raise money from the peasants—for
example, through road tolls and land
theft. In addition, some local compa-
nies that own services such as water
make deals with friends in the local
CCP government to shut down the
local well or otherwise force the rural
villagers to buy their water and/or
other services from the company.
In some cases, local authorities
routinely charge education fees to
parents. Although these practices
vary from community to community,
they collectively decrease the average
farming family’s income and drive
many children of poor families, espe-
cially those of migrant workers, out
of school. In one notorious case, a
student committed suicide because
he could not pay an $80 entrance
examination fee.13
A November 2003 survey of 7,817
migrant workers’ children, conducted
by the State Council’s National
Working Committee on Children
and Women, found that 9.3 percent
of the children interviewed either
had dropped out of school or had
never gone to school and that 60
percent of those between 12 and 14
were also employed illegally.14 In
many areas, migrant workers’ chil-
dren do not even have legal access to
local public schools. Some migrant
workers have set up their own private
schools in response.
Sparse funding also has resulted in
wage arrears for teachers. Teachers
may thus ask for payments directly
from families, adding to the financial
burden that parents must assume to
keep their children in school. Wage
arrears also prompt teachers’ migra-
tion to the cities. When the authori-
ties do not pay teachers’ salaries for
many months, economic need moti-
vates teachers to move to urban areas
to find higher paying factory jobs.
Death in Fanglin
The UN Special Rapporteur also
recommended the immediate prohi-
bition of children performing manual
labor at their schools to raise funds
or to supplement teachers’ pay.15 In
March 2001, this type of practice led
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In Fanglin village, Jiangxi Province, a deadly explosion killed
dozens of third graders who were making fireworks in their
elementary school.
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to tragic consequences in Fanglin
village, Jiangxi Province, where a
deadly explosion killed dozens of
third graders who were making fire-
works in their elementary school.
With nearly $160 million worth of
fireworks sales to the United States
in 2003, China accounts for more
than 95 percent of U.S.-imported
fireworks.16 The county surrounding
Fanglin is a center of fireworks man-
ufacturing in China.
Local government policy promoted
working instead of learning in school.
Cutting resources for education, the
government spurred schools to take
on business ventures to raise funds. It
also exempted school-based produc-
tion from taxes, inducing local facto-
ries to move production into schools.
In Fanglin, local fireworks manu-
facturers paid teachers to have their
students insert fuses and detonators
into large firecrackers. The stu-
dents, who were not paid, had to
meet production quotas before they
could go home. Parents complained
of the practice to local officials but
received no response.
The explosion—which took the lives
of more than 40 victims, almost all
children17—spurred massive public
outrage, statements of contrition,
and promises of reform. In 2002,
new child labor regulations tightened
rules and strengthened penalties. But
although fireworks production was
removed from schools, children were
not removed from fireworks factories
or from factory work countrywide.
The Fanglin explosion was not an
isolated case, just the one with the
highest death toll. In 1999 a fireworks
factory in Sanshi Pujin township,
Anhui Province, exploded, killing 
14 persons. Among the dead were 
11 child workers between 8 and 13.
The explosion occurred on the second
story of a building being used to
produce fireworks without a permit.18
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In October 2003 an explosion in a
fireworks factory located in a small
village in Hunan Province killed a
14-year-old boy and injured nine
other students under 15 who were
helping factory owners fill an urgent
order. One child lost both arms and
was badly burned. The next day, one
of the co-owners committed suicide
by drinking pesticides.19
McDonald’s and Child Labor
In 2000, worker rights advocates affil-
iated with the Hong Kong Christian
Industrial Committee (HKCIC)
reported that McDonald’s Happy
Meal toys were being produced by 
a supplier that employed child labor
from mainland China. Simon Mar-
keting, the supplier, had entered into
an agreement with City Toys, a sub-
sidiary of Pleasure Tech Holdings, to
produce Snoopy, Winnie the Pooh,
and Hello Kitty toys. Children as
young as 14 were earning $3 for 16
hours of work each day. During a site
visit, HKCIC members interviewed
factory workers. Xiao Ching, a 14-
year-old girl, said:20
“ ‘I came from Gun-Zhi High
School. I have not finished my high
school to work here. I came here a
few days after the batch of 160
children. How could I work in the
factory under-aged? Borrow others’
ID card of course. It’s common. I
used my sister’s ID card. She’s 17
years old.’
“ ‘Why did I come to work in the
factory? My family is poor. My
parents can’t even raise us, three
brothers and sisters. What are the
toys we are making? Hello Kitty
key rings. I pull the thread through.
I work till midnight every night.
It’s very tiring. Have I ever cried
for this? Tell me who in this factory
hasn’t cried?’ ”
More Reports
A review of news reports confirms
ongoing use of child labor in China.
For example, hundreds of children
work in privately owned canned
food companies in Nanning City,
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region. The average age of these
child workers is 13, and the
youngest is only nine. They earn 
9 Rmb (approximately $1) per 
day peeling pineapples. Miss Chen,
13 years old, comes from the village
of Aijichili in a suburb of Nanning
City. She said that after working six
consecutive days in the plant, her
right hand becomes red, swollen,
and infected.21
In a Japanese wholly owned garment
company in Shanghai, a journalist
received a note from a young girl
working there. The note said, “The
workload is heavy and wage is too
low. I get only 100 Rmb ($13) [per
month, one-third of the lowest
minimum wage] after working four
and a half months. The accommoda-
tion is also bad. The food is not
clean, there is no drinking water and
no water to do laundry, but they
deduct lots of utility fees from our
wages every month. Ten to twenty
people live in a room. Please help us
and please keep this confidential.”
Some of the girls are only 14 years
old, but they have to begin their work
at 8:00 a.m. and end at 9:00 p.m.,
with one hour at noontime and
without any weekends and holidays.22
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In 2000, worker rights advocates affiliated with the Hong Kong
Christian Industrial Committee reported that McDonald’s Happy
Meal toys were being produced by a supplier that employed child
labor from mainland China.
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On July 10, 2001, 17-year-old Liu
Li died of heatstroke after working
continuously for 16 hours in a hot
apparel shop in Wuhan City. While
Liu Li was not a “child worker”
under international standards, she
shared the same working conditions
with 12- and 13-year-old girls in a
cramped, tenement-style sweatshop.
As China Labour Bulletin described
the situation:23
“The total floor space was 23
square metres, in which were
placed several sewing machines, an
ironing board and an electric iron.
The room had been divided into
three separate levels using planks
of wood as false ceilings. Beneath
the workshop was another work-
room and above was a kind of attic
where the employees slept. There
was just one metre between the
makeshift ‘floor’ and the apart-
ment’s ceiling, rendering even the
most basic of activities such as
dressing an ordeal. In winter, the
girls slept in the attic but during
the unrelenting heat of Wuhan’s
summer, they slept on mats on the
floor of the lower workroom.”
These tragedies illustrate the need
for officials at the highest level of
government to acknowledge and
deal with the problem of child labor
in China. Incidents such as the
Fanglin fireworks disaster show that
the government is unresponsive and
that no organized force—including
the ACFTU—is acting as a watch-
dog for worker rights.
Trafficking of Children
China’s Ministry of Public Security
estimates that 1,000 children are
kidnapped and sold illegally each
year. According to the Chinese press,
during the first six months of 2004,
in Dongguan City, Guangdong Prov-
ince alone, 33 children between 
the ages of two and seven were re-
ported missing.24
Most human trafficking in China 
is aimed at providing brides or 
sons to lower and middle income
farmers. A minority of cases involve 
girls forced into prostitution and
children sold into forced labor.
According to the U.S. Department
of State’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices: 2003 (published in
2004), children trafficked to work
usually were sent from poorer inte-
rior areas to relatively more pros-
perous areas; traffickers often
enticed parents to relinquish their
children with promises of large
remittances that their children
would be able to send to them.25
According to some reports, women
and girls are also trafficked into and
out of the country. Women and girls
from Burma, Laos, North Korea,
Vietnam, and Russia were trafficked
into China either to work in the sex
trade or to be forced to marry Chi-
nese men. Human rights groups in
Thailand say that 12- to 18-year-old
girls from southern China, Burma,
and Laos are trafficked to Thailand
to work in the sex industry. Victims
from Yunnan Province, for example,
were promised restaurant or house-
hold work in Thailand and then pres-
sured or forced into prostitution.26
The U.S. State Department’s 2004
Trafficking in Persons Report notes:27
“China is a source, transit, and desti-
nation country for persons traf-
ficked for the purposes of forced
labor and sexual exploitation. The
domestic trafficking of women and
children for marriage and forced
labor is a significant problem. . . .
Many Chinese are smuggled abroad
at enormous personal cost and are
forced into prostitution or other
forms of exploitative labor to repay
their debts.”
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The report goes on, “China does not
fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of traf-
ficking but is making significant
efforts to do so. The Government
has adopted laws to fight trafficking
and is working with NGOs and
international organizations to
improve law enforcement training
and victim support services.”
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China has not ratified ILOConventions 29 and 105, thetwo core standards on forced
labor. Convention 29 forbids the use
of prison labor for profit-making
ventures in the wider national and
international economy. The World
Trade Organization (WTO) states in
its Article XX that products of prison
labor should not enter the flow of
international trade and that countries
may ban imports of prison-made
products: “[N]othing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures relating
to the products of prison labor.”1
ILO Convention 105 prohibits the
use of prison labor “as a means of
political coercion or education or as a
punishment for holding or express-
ing political views or views ideologi-
cally opposed to the established
political, social or economic system;
as a means of labour discipline; or as
a punishment for having participated
in strikes.”
China openly violates these interna-
tional standards.
Forced Labor and Migrant
Workers in SEZs
Problems of discrimination against
migrant workers in special economic
zone factories are compounded by
even worse employer abuse (see
Chapter 3 on Discrimination in the
Workplace for discussion of forced
overtime). Beyond the previously
discussed instances of employer-
hired thugs assaulting workers who
protested working conditions (see
Chapter 2 on Freedom of Associa-
tion), reports from several sources
indicate that some employers use
security guards, gang members, and
thugs to confine migrant workers to
their dormitories when they are not
working and threaten physical
reprisal if they try to leave. This is 
a classic manifestation of forced 
labor under international human
rights standards.
In 2001 and 2002, Chinese research-
ers from the Beijing Dajun Econo-
mic Observation and Research
Center conducted case studies of
migrant workers in several SEZ
factories.2 “The factory was in fact a
slave camp,” researchers reported.
“Workers are not allowed to contact
anyone outside.”
Fu, a young worker recruited from
her village to work in a factory in
Yiwu, Zhejiang Province, told
researchers, “It is a living hell.” She
said she was almost beaten to death.
Eventually, Fu was rescued with the
help of her father and local police.
Management allowed the girl and a
few workers from the same village to
return home, but without paying
them a penny. Asked whether the
workers had thought of suing the
factory, Fu responded, “I did but the
local police said, ‘This is a labor
dispute, [it] should be handled by the
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Some employers use security guards, gang members, and thugs to
confine migrant workers to their dormitories when they are not
working and threaten physical reprisal if they try to leave.
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labor department, we cannot offer
any help in this regard.’ ”
This example illustrates the problems
posed by an environment of lax en-
forcement. Even if a path to justice
exists, workers may not be able to find
it. In this case, the police were unin-
terested in dealing with what was
clearly a criminal offense, vaguely
passing off the responsibility to a large
state bureaucracy where securing
redress would be, if at all possible,
expensive and time consuming.
Chinese Emigrant Workers
In addition to moving from the
countryside to urban areas, millions
of Chinese workers migrate out of
the country for work. Much of this
emigration is to other Asian coun-
tries and to the Middle East. As
major receiving destinations of
smuggled Chinese workers, the
United States and U.S. territories are
also implicated. The late 1990s saw
many exposés of abuse and exploita-
tion of Chinese emigrant workers at
garment factories in U.S.-controlled
Saipan, located in the Northern
Marianas Islands territory.3
Chinese state agencies are actively
involved in exporting laborers to the
rest of the world. According to the
2001 state economic plan, China
intended to export millions of labo-
rers. These agencies charge large
sums to migrating workers. One offi-
cial advertisement recruiting workers
for Macau required “18-28 female,
healthy, good-looking, elegant”
applicants to submit—along with
full-figure, half-figure, and side
photos—a fee of 45,000 Rmb
(approximately $5,000) for most
areas and 50,000 Rmb ($6,500) for
Fujian. Another ad charged prospec-
tive butchers 70,000 Rmb (approxi-
mately $10,000) to secure a year’s
work in England. This fee did not
include the cost of airfare, health
clearance, notary, and visa.4
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Often, conditions for emigrant
workers are tantamount to forced or
bonded labor, and sometimes they
can have fatal consequences. In June
2000, for example, 58 Chinese em-
igrant workers died while being
smuggled into England in a truck
loaded with tomatoes. In January
2000, four Chinese emigrants were
found dead of starvation and dehy-
dration in the hold of the cargo ship
Cape May when it docked in Seattle
harbor after a ten-day voyage from
Hong Kong. The four were among
18 workers who had paid smugglers
$40,000 apiece to be confined in the
40-foot container.5
Thousands of Chinese migrants
labor in the United States in virtual
bondage, working to pay off debts
incurred for being smuggled into
the country. According to one
report, Chinese garment workers in
New York owed $50,000 to loan
sharks who paid illegal recruiters,
sometimes called “snakeheads,” to
bring them into the United States
illegally. The ILO notes, “The chal-
lenge confronting the global com-
munity is to manage migration so
that it can serve as a force for
growth and development, and not
lead to clandestine movements and
the dangers these pose for estab-
lished institutions and the respect
for labor standards.”6
Prison Labor
China puts a vast labor force of pris-
oners to work in the laogai system.
Laogai is a Mandarin word that
means “reform through labor,” but
today it has a wider colloquial
meaning that refers to the entire
system of forced labor in China.
Official figures put the working pris-
oner population at more than a
million, but most independent esti-
mates are many times that.7
The actual size of the laogai system is
a state secret of the PRC, and know-
ing the precise number of inmates or
facilities is therefore impossible. The
Laogai Research Foundation (LRF)
is the leading authority on the laogai
system and is chiefly responsible for
most of the data available on the
laogai today. The foundation pub-
lishes an updated Laogai Handbook
that contains information on more
than 1,200 laogai facilities as of 2000,
with an estimated prisoner population
of 4 to 6 million. The LRF estimates
that since the laogai was established
in the early 1950s, between 40 and 50
million prisoners have gone through
the system. The LRF has documented
a vast network of laogai facilities 
producing many items exported to
other countries.8
The term “prison labor” is too narrow
a term to describe the laogai system,
for prison evokes criminal incarcera-
tion. There is ample evidence that
many who fill the ranks of the laogai
did not receive a criminal sentence
and also that many actual criminal
sentences resulted from politically
motivated prosecutions.
According to the LRF, the laogai
system in China encompasses a
broad range of forced labor manufac-
turing units that include normal
prisons, “reeducation through labor”
(RTL, also called “administrative
discipline” or laodong jiaoyang) facili-
ties, detention centers, juvenile
offender facilities, and “forced job
placement.” “Forced job placement”
is reserved for convicts who have
served out their formal sentences and
are considered to still need rehabili-
tation; they are “placed” in the forced
labor system with prisoners who are
still serving their sentences.
RTL is a sentence of up to three years
handed down by the Chinese Public
Security Bureau. The sentence also
can be extended by one year. It involves
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no charges or court proceedings of
any sort. Amnesty International notes
that the RTL system remains in place
and continues to be imposed in con-
travention of international human
rights standards:9
“People receiving terms of RTL
have no right of access to a lawyer
and there is no hearing for them 
to defend themselves. ‘Sentencing’
or assignment to a term of RTL 
is usually decided by the police
alone, without judicial supervision
or review.
“The use of this form of administra-
tive detention has increased consid-
erably in recent years. . . . Although
recent official figures are not avail-
able, the number is believed to have
further increased . . . due to the
continuing campaign against the
Falun Gong and the ‘strike hard’
campaign against crime which has
continued since April 2001.
“RTL contravenes various interna-
tional human rights standards,
including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the UN Body 
of Principles for the Protection of
All Persons under any form of
Detention or Imprisonment, and
the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
which was signed by China in
1998. In particular, RTL contra-
venes Article 9 of the ICCPR
which prohibits arbitrary detention
and Articles 8(3)(a) and (b) of the
ICCPR which prohibit forced or
compulsory labour unless imposed
as a punishment for a crime by a
competent court.”
A 2003 report by a non-govern-
mental organization (NGO) con-
tains a 2001 document (No. 56) from
the State Bureau of Taxation under
China’s Ministry of Finance. This
document clearly states that if the
property rights of a company are
solely owned by a prison or forced
labor camp system, the company is
exempt from corporate income tax
and the land inquisition levy.
The report includes a translation of
an advertisement designed to attract
foreign and domestic investment in
laogai production, in this case a
mining company. The ad flaunts the
government support of its operations
as a bonus for would-be investors:10
“Xinsheng Coal Mine of Hunan
Province, also known as Southern
Hunan Prison of Hunan Province,
located in Huangshi, Laiyang of
Hunan Province . . . offers cheap,
abundant labor forces, . . . (cheaper
labors are available if prison
inmates are used), relatively low
operating costs. . . . Our business is
a special enterprise, enjoys an
amicable relationship with the local
government and relevant offices,
and is a recipient of various prefer-
ential policies granted by the
government. We provide a flexible,
harmonious investment environ-
ment. . . . Xinsheng Coal Mine
warmly welcomes both domestic
and overseas investment.”
Laogai Labor Cases
In a 1996 White Paper, the govern-
ment of China insisted, “China
prohibits export of products made
with prison labour. No competent
Chinese authorities have ever given
any reform-through-labour unit 
the right to export commodities.
The Chinese Government is very
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strict on this point and any viola-
tions of these regulations are dealt
with severely.”11
The report goes on:
“In China, products are produced 
by prison labour mainly to meet
needs occurring within the reform-
through-labour system. Only a
small proportion of such products
enter the domestic market through
normal channels. Profit from reform-
through-labour work activities is
mainly used for improving the pris-
oners’ living conditions, upgrading
their common living areas and facili-
ties and maintaining production.”
Despite these attestations, com-
pelling evidence indicates that
prison manufacture of products for
export into the global economy is
widespread, in clear violation of
international labor standards on
forced labor.
The 2003 NGO report contains
detailed testimonials of prison
laborers producing for export-
oriented companies. In 2001, for
example, Beijing Mickey Toys Co., a
producer of soft toys since 1987, had
an order to do handwork on toy
rabbits produced at Beijing Xin’an
Female Labor Camp. Beijing
Mickey Toys was itself a subcon-
tractor for Nestlé, which used the
toys for promotions around the
world. The testimony of Jennifer
Zeng describes in detail how and
under what conditions the toy
rabbits were produced:12
“Usually we began work after getting
up at 5 o’clock in the morning, and
worked until 2 or 3 o’clock in the
morning the next day. Sometimes
we had to work overtime, otherwise
we could not finish the job. At the
busiest time, I did not dare to wash
my hands after going to the toilet,
in order to save a few minutes. At
night, sometimes I was so exhausted
that I could not even count clearly
from 1 to 9. Yet I still had to force
my eyes open to knit sweaters. The
pattern of the sweater was quite
complicated; sometimes we finally
finished the knitting after much
effort only to discover the next
morning it had been knitted com-
pletely wrongly. So, we had to
unpick the stitches and redo it.
Long hours of highly intensive
workload and severe lack of sleep
made me feel, for a very long period
of time, that the only thing I needed
in my life was sleep.”
Lanzhou Zhenglin Nongken Food
Ltd. was established in 1988. In
1992, the company embarked on a
joint venture with Lanzhou Dashap-
ing Detention Center and Lanzhou
No. 1 Detention Center (also known
as Xiguoyuan Detention Center).
According to the report:
“Some 10,000 detainees . . . were
forced to use their hands to peel the
shells off melon seeds, and were
engaged in intensive physical labor
work. Those detainees were forced
to crack the seeds of a large variety
of melon between their teeth, and
then peel the husk off with their
bare hands to remove the kernels.
In winter, they had to do this work
outside in the freezing cold. Many
of them suffered frostbite and the
skin on their hands split, with pus
and blood from the wounds oozing
onto the melon seeds. In the sum-
mer, the cracking and extracting of
kernels from shells continued
unabated. Many had their teeth
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for export into the global economy is widespread.
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 5
Forced Labor
73
cracked and damaged from crack-
ing melon seeds, and even lost their
fingernails in the process of extract-
ing the kernels from their shells.
The detainees were forced to squat
on their heels to do the work from
early morning till evening for more
than ten hours continuously, with
no pay.”
The report claims that Lanzhou
Zhenglin Nongken Food Ltd. is
China’s largest producer of roasted
seeds and nuts, that its annual sales
were 460 million Rmb (about $70
million) in 1999, and that it exports
to more than 30 countries.
Next, the report details the relation-
ship between Jinan Tianyi Printing
Co. and Shandong No. 1 Female
Labor Camp ( Jinan Female Labor
Camp). It describes the working
conditions within the camps in the
following terms:
“Due to working overtime for long
periods of time, a lot of detainees
had difficulty standing, and it was
very common for someone to faint
in the workshop. Those who re-
fused to work would be put into a
‘confined solitary compartment’
which was totally dark. The practi-
tioners confined there were not
allowed to go to sleep, to wash their
faces or brush their teeth. They
were also not allowed to come out
of the compartment to go to toilet
and were forced to stand continu-
ously for more than 20 days until
they became unconscious. These
people would then have such swol-
len feet that they could not wear
shoes and could not walk. . . . In the
workshops, where the colored
patterns are printed, the smell of
chemical paints causes severe irrita-
tion to the eyes and the respiratory
system of the practitioners doing
the forced labor. . . . In some cases,
in order to finish the work sent in
by these enterprises, the labor camp
would force the practitioners to
work through the night. For those 
. . . who could not finish their
workload, they would have their
terms in the labor camp extended.”
Another testimonial in the report
comes from a November 2003 state-
ment by prisoner Lin Shenli:
“In the labor camp, every morning 
I was forced to get up to start work
around 6:00 a.m. I was not allowed
to stop until 9:00 p.m. The work
was manual labor, making rubber
sports balls. It involved using iron
needles to punch holes and then
using threads to stitch through the
holes and the two threads had to be
pulled and tightened at the end of
the process. After long periods of
the same repeated tasks, my hands
got mutilated by the threads and
started to bleed. The threads were
waxed and prisoners informed me
that wax is poisonous. That ex-
plained why both of my hands were
swollen and infected. Due to long
hours of intensive labor work, a
large area of my chest and buttocks
began to bleed and ulcerate. Espec-
ially, in the ulcerated buttock area,
blood seeped onto my underwear
and tracksuit pants. Every day my
clothes were like they had been
soaked in blood and water. As the
blood dried up on my underwear
and then became wet again, several
times a day, the underwear would
eventually get stuck onto my skin.
This made walking very difficult,
including taking off my underwear
when going to the toilet. Every
time when I had to force it off, a
layer of my skin would be peeled
off as well. At night, I couldn’t sleep
properly because I couldn’t lie
down. Coupled with the long hours
of hard intensive labor, I was ex-
hausted. If I did fall asleep at night,
it was restless as, if I accidentally
touched the sore parts of my body, I
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would be woken up by the most
excruciating pain. Even though I
was in this condition, I was not
allowed to rest. I was still forced to
work intensively. Through forced
labor, the cost of the production of
goods in China was kept very low.”
The report also details working
conditions in the Shuanghe Labor
Camp, where prisoners were made
to package toxic agricultural fertil-
izer by hand for Qiqiha’er Siyou
Chemical Industry Co. Ltd. The
report describes the conditions
within the camp:
“The polluted air in this chemical
plant is so bad that even from a
distance, you could smell a strong,
rancid odor. Manufacturing work
itself is dirty, painful, tiring, and
toxic. In production, heavy smoke
full of chemical dust floated around
the entire production unit, and
settled all over a person’s clothes,
eyebrows, and eyelashes. Even
wearing a few protective masks,
[prisoners] were choked from the
chemical exposure, with nasal
passages and eyes becoming swol-
len. In addition, the agricultural
chemical plant is very toxic to
people’s health. Some incurred red
eyes and faces, chapped hands, as
well as major skin irritations all
over their bodies. Some of the fe-
males stopped menstruating for a
few months or even the entire year.
There are no hazardous material
suits provided and masks are only
assigned to practitioners once.
Gloves have never been assigned. It
is clearly stipulated that all who
handle or are in proximity to toxic
substances, must take showers at
the end of every day. However,
[prisoners] were not permitted to
take showers. . . .With the com-
bined heat, over-exhaustion and
sweat (combined with chemical
dust), skin became very itchy and
painful. When the sweat evapo-
rated from their skin, a ‘ringworm’
shaped rash appeared.”
The report appendix contains one
final testimonial of experiences in
the laogai in 2003:
“I only want to let you know how
some products from China are
made and why they are so cheap.
In prison, I was forced to work on
export products such as toys and
shopping bags without pay. I still
remember one of the shopping bags
was printed with ‘National Gallery
of Art.’ The cell was only about 300
square feet in size, with 20 pris-
oners and one toilet inside. They
slept and worked in the cell. Some-
times we were forced to work until
2:00 a.m. to keep up with the
schedule. They only provided two
meals a day (only once a week you
have meat in your food). In other
words, being hungry, you still need
to work more than 15 hours per day.
The police used a wire whip to beat
you if you did not do a good job or
you could not keep up with the
schedule. During this desperate time
in prison, I was always wondering
who gave them the business and
who helped them to abuse us.”
China-U.S. Memorandum of
Understanding and
Continued Prison Labor
In 1992, China and the United
States signed a groundbreaking
memorandum of understanding
(MOU) titled On Prohibiting Import
and Export Trade in Prison Labor
Products. Among key MOU provi-
sions: China must “promptly” inves-
tigate companies that were violating
the ban on export of laogai products,
exchange information on enforce-
ment at the request of one signatory,
share evidence of violations of the
MOU, and arrange inspection visits
by “responsible officials.” Specif-
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ically, the MOU allowed for U.S.
officials to conduct such inspec-
tions—but only U.S. diplomats,
not human rights experts or other
experts joining inspection groups.13
Prior to his election as U.S. Presi-
dent, Bill Clinton stated plans to link
China’s continued Most Favored
Nation trade status (now called
Normal Trade Relations, or NTR) to
progress on human rights. Sub-
sequently, China essentially scoffed
at the MOU and its commitments.
The U.S. State Department tried to
put the best face on its deal with
China to show that the new presi-
dent’s tougher policy was getting
results, but department officials had
to concede that results were far
below expectations:14
“The overall implementation of the
prison labor agreement has generally
been characterized by poor commu-
nications, slow and cursory res-
ponses to investigation questions,
and stonewalling or rejection of
request for visits. . . . We have
presented 31 cases of suspected
prison labor violations to the
Chinese for investigation. . . . We
requested visits to five sites. We have
visited only one of these facilities,
the Jinma Diesel factory, while our
repeated requests to see the others
have been rejected. . . . . We have
repeatedly encountered Chinese
delays in providing responses to our
requests for visits, and their investi-
gation reports often lack detail.”
In 1994 the Clinton administration
buckled under pressure from U.S.
multinational corporations, giving
up its claim to be using trade policy
as leverage to press China on prison
labor and other human rights viola-
tions. China used its new free pass
to ignore its prison labor obliga-
tions. A 1993 U.S. request to in-
spect the Dezhou Machine Works
factory in Shandong Province was
not granted until 2000, seven years
after the LRF presented credible
evidence that prisoners were pro-
ducing diesel engines for export to
the United States. When the
Chinese government finally let U.S.
officials inspect the factory, the 
U.S. inspectors found that it was
making only rickshaws for the
domestic Chinese market and
discovered “no sign that U.S.-bound
exports were being made.”15
Violations were so blatant and
enforcement was so lax that it took
amateur detective work by a U.S.
businessman to expose one of the
worst cases of prison labor on prod-
ucts exported to the United States.
The owner of Gem Office Products,
a binder clip manufacturing firm that
sourced production in a Chinese
factory, saw his U.S. sales plummet
when another company called Allied
International Manufacturing Cor-
poration (AIMCO) began selling
clips for a fraction of his price. The
businessman “traveled to China and
returned with videotapes of the clips
coming out of the Nanjing prison on
a truck. . . . [He] climbed into the
back of the truck while it was stopped
in traffic and sneaked a look at the
clips inside” to gather evidence of
prison labor production. In 2000,
AIMCO pled guilty to importing
into the U.S. market millions of
paper binder clips assembled by
forced labor.16
Enforcement of the prison labor
MOU has not improved appreciably
under the Bush administration. The
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“In prison, I was forced to work on export products such as toys and
shopping bags without pay. I still remember one of the shopping
bags was printed with ‘National Gallery of Art.’ ”
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U.S. Customs Service has conceded
that it does not have the capacity to
enforce the agreement fully, saying
that “the AIMCO case highlighted
. . . a vital aspect of our prison labor
investigations . . . that is our need for
reliable investigative leads, including
those provided by outside sources.”17
A 2002 U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission policy
paper on the laogai concluded that
the main obstacle to the Customs
investigations was that “the PRC is
not abiding by the 1992 and 1994
agreements it negotiated with 
the U.S. government.” The 
commission recommended shifting
the burden of proof from the 
PRC to corporations suspected 
of importing laogai products into
the United States. Specifically,
it called for a certification based 
on “good faith efforts” of U.S.
companies that import Chinese
products into the United States,
as well as more prompt inspection
of Chinese facilities suspected 
of forced labor.18
The commission called on the U.S.
government to maintain a list of
“suspicious companies” suspected of
importing laogai products into the
United States, a bonding procedure
to give companies an incentive to
follow the ban, an addition to the
annual U.S. State Department
country human rights reports
containing detailed information on
laogai facilities, and the appoint-
ment of a special counsel devoted
to the prosecution of violators.
None of these recommendations
has been adopted.
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A Global Power in the Balance: 
The Future of Worker Rights in China
C H A P T E R  6
Whatever the course ofeconomic and politicalrelations in the twenty-
first century, China will be a major
regional and global power. The ques-
tion is: Will China’s power be a force
for advancing democracy, human
rights, and social and economic well-
being, or will China choose to lead a
race to the economic and political
bottom, based on political oppression
and worker exploitation? 
China is undergoing a twofold trans-
formation. It is rapidly changing
from a poor, rural nation in which
peasant farmers constitute the vast
majority to an urbanizing and indus-
trializing country whose millions of
peasants leave their rural villages
each year to take up factory work in
new industrial cities. At the same
time, China’s party-state monopoly,
once held in every sphere—in poli-
tics, in the economy and in civil
society—is breaking up. A burgeon-
ing open market within a highly
competitive capitalist economy is
transforming the economic land-
scape, while the one-party state
continues to rule in the political
realm and in civil society. These
profound changes have unleashed
powerful new forces that increasingly
collide with existing institutional
structures. Chinese intellectuals, who
often have led the forces seeking to
extend economic reforms to the
political sphere, have repeatedly
clashed with opposing powers com-
mitted to maintaining the status quo
and denying basic human rights. The
resulting series of confrontations
have often begun as peaceful mass
protests and ended with violent state
suppression followed by long jail
sentences for the leaders, as in the
Tiananmen Square movement and
the Liaoning labor protest.1
Today’s Challenges
The primary victims of this upheaval
have been China’s workers. Their
government violates workers’ funda-
mental rights in both law and 
practice, a fact widely accepted in
multiple international arenas. Robert
Rosoff, an analyst writing for the US-
China Business Council, the leading
association of U.S. multinational
companies investing in China, says:2
“The attraction of doing business in
China is undeniable. The country’s
low labor costs, in particular, enable
companies to manufacture apparel,
footwear, toys, and many other
products very cheaply. . . . At the
same time, terrible labor rights and
human rights conditions persist
even as China’s economy develops.
“Generalizations are difficult, but are
possible based on evidence of labor
rights abuse in PRC factories:
n Labor rights violations are so
widespread in China that viola-
tions can be presumed to exist 
in every factory until proven
otherwise. . . .
n Although China has an adequate
labor law, it is poorly enforced.
n China has a virtually inexhaustible
supply of migrant workers, most
of whom are ignorant of their
rights under Chinese law and are
willing to work under any condi-
tions without protest.
n The Chinese government pro-
hibits the existence of indepen-
dent trade unions, leaving workers
without representatives who can
discuss violations with manage-
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ment. Workers who have tried 
to form independent unions or
lead labor protests have been
imprisoned.
“Labor protests are increasing in
China as a result of labor rights
abuse, rising unemployment, lack of
a social safety net, fraud by some
factory owners, and lack of respon-
siveness by government officials.
Often, when workers protest in large
numbers, the Chinese government
will arrest and imprison the protest
leaders and pay off the workers.”
China has not yet become a nation
governed by the rule of law, an ideal
cited in its constitution. Misallo-
cations of power are institutionalized.
China’s local courts are financed by
local governments that select the
judges, pay their salaries, and often
influence the outcome of cases. They
focus on pursuing their own purposes
instead of enforcing national law.
Many judges are poorly trained. Both
officials and the Chinese public criti-
cize corruption in the courts.3
One must take care, however, not to
portray China as nothing but a giant
sweatshop where all workers and all
efforts at worker advocacy are brutally
suppressed. Reality is more subtle and
complex. Recent developments
suggest to some experts that workers
and their allies have new openings
they can use to pursue progress, but
the value of these openings is hotly
debated. One expert is pessimistic:4
“We have not seen fundamental
improvements in civil and political
rights since 1989. . . . The regime
continues to deny people the right
to organize politically, and deci-
sively crushes any political or reli-
gious movement that challenges its
hold on power. . . . [T]he political
reforms that we see are aimed at
improving the Party’s legitimacy
without allowing any opposition to
take shape.”
Others discern opportunities to
create more space for freedom of
association. One analyst notes that
the Chinese government is working
to strengthen legal institutions,
systematically reviewing proposed
laws and regulations for consistency
with existing laws, and experi-
menting with the use of hearings to
promote greater transparency in the
legislative and regulatory develop-
ment processes. Unfortunately, the
judicial system is not sufficiently
funded, and local governments tend
to resist structural reforms that
would diminish their power. Even if
the law guaranteed freedom of asso-
ciation, the current legal environ-
ment could not support it.5
The ultimate value of these openings
will depend on whether they are used
as springboards to consistently move
toward winning ever greater measures
of freedom of association, or whether
they serve only as short-term, stop-
gap approaches that merely relieve
popular pressure for change and
diffuse support for democratic reform.
New Responses 
Within the ACFTU 
In the sphere of civil society, the
state-party control of labor organi-
zation is enforced through the legal
monopoly of the All-China Federa-
tion of Trade Unions. The ACFTU
has traditionally taken a top-down,
bureaucratic, and reactive approach
to workplace issues, more aimed at
workforce control than at worker
representation. Its monopoly is a
gross violation of the basic human
right of freedom of association.
Some elements within the ACFTU
are now beginning to recognize that
labor law is weak and ineffectively
enforced. The ACFTU’s own 2004
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annual report highlighted discrimi-
nation in employment, sexual harass-
ment, the wage gap between men
and women, and serious violations of
labor law as continuing problems.6
A few ACFTU cadres realize that the
“transmission belt” model of monop-
olistic unionism under government
control is a failure, and thus they
support a more proactive ACFTU
role.These groups, which are probably
closely linked to reform factions within
the CCP, are looking for ways to 
be more independent of the gov-
ernment and of employers. They aim
to act more like leaders of genuine
trade unions that defend the workers
they represent instead of lecturing
them about government policy.
Some ACFTU leaders are becoming
more directly involved with work-
place problems and support the
workers’ position at times, particu-
larly in foreign-owned companies.
An ACFTU division director told
China Daily in August 2004 that
many private and foreign companies
in China deprive workers of their
constitutional right to establish trade
unions and that “workers need unions
more than ever to represent and
protect their interests.” ACFTU
head Wang Zhaoguo said, “[T]rade
unions have assumed the responsi-
bility of speaking out for the workers
and seeking fair solutions for them.
. . . We should punish those who
have prevented the establishment of
trade unions in line with the law.” 7
These departures from the tradi-
tional approach can also be seen 
in the efforts of a few regional
ACFTU organizations, which are
pressing firms to sign citywide or
regional framework agreements for
collective contracts in different
industrial sectors to standardize
wages and benefits for that sector in
the city or region. The ACFTU
indicates that by the end of 2003,
some 672,900 signed collective
contracts covered 1.214 million
enterprises with 103.5 million
workers, but the extent to which
rank and file workers participated in
that process has varied widely. On
September 13, 2004, the ACFTU
announced that it intended to cover
60 percent of workers with collective
bargaining contracts by the year
2008. Under principles of freedom
of association, the real indicator of
progress will be not the number of
contracts signed but the extent to
which rank and file workers have
participated in the process and taken
ownership of their negotiating role.8
Government authorities have toler-
ated a few “wildcat” work actions.
In Wenling City, Zhejiang Province,
for example, 12,000 workers in 113
privately owned wool sweater facto-
ries secured a collective contract
after four years of protests. Begin-
ning in the late summer of 2001,
workers citywide conducted strikes
annually during the busy season.
Workers pushed for wage negotia-
tions, prompting employers to create
an employer negotiating committee.
The local ACFTU organized bar-
gaining sessions. In October 2004,
a collective agreement was signed,
providing workers with a minimum
wage of 800 Rmb ($104) per month.
In addition, a sector-based union
(which differs from the typical
enterprise-based union) was subse-
quently formed.9
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Under principles of freedom of association, the real indicator of
progress will be not the number of contracts signed but the extent to
which rank and file workers have participated in the process and
taken ownership of their negotiating role.
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The ACFTU also claims that it has
been conducting a campaign for the
past four years to hold shop floor
elections at a number of coastal area
factories that mostly produce for
foreign-owned companies. It indi-
cates that one-third of its 120,000
local unions in the Guangdong
Province have held such elections,
although the lack of independent
verification leads experts to doubt
their legitimacy. The ACFTU
announced last September that it
was working on a law for local elec-
tions, to be applied throughout the
country. Its discussion of the need
for elections is encouraging.
But occasional democratic shop
floor elections have not supplanted
the predominant method of factory
executives appointing managers as
union leaders in China. The trans-
mission belt model still permeates
ACFTU activity, and there is no
sign that tight CCP control of the
labor movement will change in the
foreseeable future. Like other labor-
related issues in China, this situation
is in flux. The unknown factor is the
extent to which workers and their
advocates can use the nascent but
limited openings within ACFTU
structures to increase their defense
of existing rights, while at the same
time advocating for their govern-
ment to fully honor freedom of asso-
ciation in law and in practice.
Multinational Companies 
At a few workplaces linked to global
brand name companies, workers
have chosen their ACFTU shop
union leaders. In July 2001, for ex-
ample, company and ACFTU offi-
cials at the Kong Tai shoe factory, a
Reebok supplier firm in Longgang,
organized a secret ballot election 
of shop floor union representatives.
In October 2002, Reebok and
another big supplier firm in Fujian
Province conducted a similar elec-
tion. In both cases, Reebok manage-
ment promoted the vote after
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finding that most appointed union
representatives in the largely female
workforce were male managers,
white collar employees, and security
officials. After sustained lobbying
by Reebok, plant management and
the ACFTU agreed to follow up
with an education program for the
new union leaders. Independent
Hong Kong-based NGOs con-
ducted the training.10
While these elections may represent
a step toward freedom of associa-
tion, it would be premature to label
them as a trend. The Reebok elec-
tions are isolated cases that took
place in two among tens of thou-
sands of global supply chain work-
places in China. Most “grievances”
in these two plants have involved
harsh treatment by supervisors, not
classic bargaining issues like wages
and benefits. The longer-term sus-
tainability of democratic union
action in these two plants is yet to
be determined.
The impact of the application of
codes of conduct must also be care-
fully assessed. Many multinational
enterprises, for example, have codes
of conduct that call for freedom of
association and respect for interna-
tional and national worker rights.
But some codes provide a loophole
that allows enterprises to operate in
places such as China, where freedom
of association is prohibited. The
loophole requires only that compa-
nies adopt “parallel means” to facili-
tate worker communication with
management on employment issues.
These “parallel means,” generally of
the “suggestion box” type, are
demonstrably ineffective in facili-
tating real worker representation.11
Moreover, the use of codes of con-
duct can sometimes soften abuses of
labor standards in selected workplaces
without ever calling into question
systematic violations of core worker
rights such as freedom of associa-
tion. Perhaps more typical than the
Reebok example is the case of a
closely studied supplier to Switcher, a
Swiss multinational company. Hong
Kong-based researchers interviewed
workers at the Wongsheng Gar-
ments factory in Changzhou to
assess implementation of Switcher’s
code of conduct. On an initial visit,
they found that contrary to Chinese
law, no union or anything resem-
bling a union existed at this 1,000-
worker factory and that “no effective
complaint mechanism was in place.”
Follow-up interviews on the re-
searchers’ recommendation to estab-
lish “an effective channel enabling
workers to voice their concerns”
revealed that the company had taken
only limited action:12
“By the time of the follow-up visit,
a union affiliated to the local
Changzhou Garments Industry
Trade Union had been set up,
composed of management staff
and workers. It had 95 members
by January 2003 but only 10 were
production workers and half were
management staff. Its activities
since July 2002 when it had been
set up were the organization of
social events. Its composition and
mode of interaction with manage-
ment were not clear to the auditors.
The workers were not interested in
joining this union, as they consid-
ered that it had been set up in a
top-down way and were not con-
tacting the union committee mem-
bers whose phone numbers were
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The use of codes of conduct can sometimes soften abuses of labor
standards in selected workplaces without ever calling into question
systematic violations of core worker rights.
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displayed at different locations to
voice their grievances.
“In addition to the trade union, a
five-member ‘social compliance
committee’ had been set up, com-
posed of staff members, some of
whom were also sitting on the union
committee. This other committee
had devised a quite complex griev-
ance procedure distinguishing
between minor and major com-
plaints. Only three grievances
(minor) had been reported over
several months and the workers did
not use the suggestion boxes that
had been set up and did not trust
these communication channels. In
spite of the sophistication of these
different procedures, and given the
attitude of workers, the auditors
were not convinced that they offered
an adequate solution to the impor-
tant question of effective communi-
cation channels between workers 
and management.”
The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
(OECD), an international organiza-
tion grouping 30 member countries
that “share a commitment to demo-
cratic principles,” has developed
Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises that include recommendations
on labor and employment relations,
notably freedom of association and
the right to collective bargaining.
Although these guidelines are not
legally enforceable, the governments
involved have agreed to use their
influence to press multinational
enterprises to follow these recom-
mendations. Further, in the revised
Guidelines (2000), language was
added on supply chains to support
worker rights.13
Unfortunately, the vast majority of
multinational enterprises do not
follow the OECD guidelines in
their operations in China. The
handful of corporations that have
tried to influence PRC government
policy in favor of freedom of associ-
ation have failed.
Many companies have instituted
“independent monitoring” programs,
hoping that these programs might
substitute for independent worker
representation, at least to the extent
of guaranteeing certain minimum
standards. One company representa-
tive responsible for “code compli-
ance” programs publicly noted the
importance of worker involvement 
in the monitoring process. “It’s our
hope,” he said, “that issues can be
taken up by the worker representa-
tives. . . . We have inspections of
factories, both announced and unan-
nounced. But you just don’t have the
assurance that things will be the same
the next day. Factories in China are
incredibly sophisticated at finding
ways to fool us. The best monitors 
are the workers themselves.”14
The recognition of this principle is
encouraging. But since the only guar-
antee of long-term improvement in
working conditions is freedom of
association, codes of conduct can be
effective only if they support and
affirm full freedom of association.
They are not effective if they are used
merely to make minimal improve-
ments or enhance a company’s public
image. Accordingly, the few multina-
tionals that have attempted to facili-
tate worker representation by holding
elections for worker representatives
have ultimately not been successful in
securing a sustained, democratic, ef-
fective voice for workers.
Legal Assistance 
In some cities and export zones,
legal aid centers outside trade union
structures are taking shape to assist
workers with claims before courts
and arbitration boards. Workers are
demanding the application of the
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 6
n JUSTICE FOR ALL n CHINA
84
rule of law in labor affairs separate
from union organizing. Their
complaints and declarations often
invoke laws and legal rights.
In addition, the government has
authorized the development of a
private bar and has required private
lawyers to take on a certain number
of pro bono cases each year. To coor-
dinate these legal aid cases and to
handle appeals, the government
began to sponsor legal aid programs
in 1994, and set up regional legal aid
bureaus. Most of the cases handled
by legal aid bureaus deal with labor
law. They address such issues as
unpaid back wages, harassment of
migrant workers, inappropriate disci-
pline, employer constraints on
worker mobility and free exit, unsafe
working environments, and indus-
trial accident compensation. Legal
clinics devoted to labor law and
women’s issues, some university-
affiliated clinics, and law school clin-
ical training programs supplement
this work. While these developments
are a positive step, the demand for
lawyers who are available to workers
far exceeds supply.
A small number of cases filed are
designed to obtain decisions with
impact on regional or national
worker rights. Some are group cases
with potentially high monetary
compensation. In a 2004 case, for
example, 1,000 retired workers 
from the Tieshu textile factory
brought a class action lawsuit against
the Suizhou City Social Insurance
Bureau for failure to pay pensions
due workers after their forced
retirement from the plant. Other
textile workers announced that 
they would sue the city govern-
ment for alleged ill treatment
during their detention by police 
in earlier protest demonstrations.15
Several legal clinics have begun to
assist women migrants in filing
claims against employers and local
labor bureaus. In one case in Beijing,
24 migrant women workers from
Laishui County, Hebei Province,
who worked for Beijing’s Hua Yi
garment factory from 1995 to 1997
sought help from the Peking Uni-
versity Center for Women’s Law
Studies and Legal Services when
their employer withheld their wages.
The company forced the women to
work overtime under extremely harsh
conditions, and managers routinely
beat and insulted them. With the
help of the legal aid attorneys, the
women were eventually awarded
170,000 Rmb (about $14,000) in
back wages and compensation after
several filings and judgments.16
In a few locations, lawyers, clinics,
and legal aid organizations also work
to increase rank and file workers’
understanding of Chinese labor law
and worker rights. These groups fax
copies of laws and regulations, dis-
tribute informational pamphlets,
hold evening and weekend training
sessions in parks and factory dormi-
tory areas, and provide telephone
and in-person legal consultations.
Individual workers can bring claims,
mostly related to minimum wage
and hour laws, through an estab-
lished mediation and arbitration
process; sometimes these workers
prevail. In a few locations, laid-off
workers deprived of pensions and
severance pay in industrial restruc-
turing are creating formal and
informal associations to help one
another and to seek justice from
authorities.
The fact that some workers can use
the legal system to rectify violations
of their rights is good news, but
changing the system requires far
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more than worker centers based in
migrant communities, legal clinics,
and NGOs assisting workers can
achieve. As one expert notes:17
“The causes of authoritarian re-
silience . . . include . . . building of
channels of demand and complaint
making for the population, such as
the courts, media, local elections,
. . . and letters and visits depart-
ments, which give people the
feeling that there are ways to seek
relief from administrative injustices.
These institutions encourage indi-
vidual rather than group based
inputs, and they focus complaints
against specific local level agencies
or officials, without making
possible attacks on the regime.
Thus they enable citizens to pursue
grievances in ways that present no
threat to the regime as a whole.”
Exclusive reliance on legal strategies
can actually retard genuine inde-
pendent trade union development
and entrench the government-run
union system. Moreover, it does not
provide an efficient means of solving
labor disputes in a cost-effective and
timely manner. One analyst who
promotes corporate social responsi-
bility as an avenue of change in
China notes, “[T]he lack of basic
civil and political freedoms means
that the normal mechanisms through
which civil society ameliorates labor
abuses are absent.”18
In any case, the legal and adminis-
trative frameworks for productively
channeling private enterprise indus-
trial strife and managing the closure
of state-owned enterprises remain
inadequate. Legal aid cannot keep
up with a private sector of millions
of independent employers and other
actors, all autonomously and vigor-
ously pursuing their own private
interests. The legal aid programs for
labor law are poorly funded. More
legal aid funding is allocated to
criminal than to civil matters, and
the high volume of labor cases must
divide what remains with other civil
concerns such as women’s rights,
divorce, and rural land issues. Poor
enforcement of judgments, lack of
legal clarity in the law, expense,
delays, and other ongoing troubles
in the legal system all contribute to
the problem.
As a result, explosive grievances accu-
mulate unresolved; the 150,000 to
200,000 legal practitioners who must
cover all areas of law are inadequate
to meet the needs of 800 million
workers.19 The festering claims for
billions in wage arrears, for better and
safer working conditions in industries
where thousands die every year, for
social security in retirement, and for
full enfranchisement of migrant work-
ers threaten social stability and under-
line the strong need for a system of
independent worker and employer
institutions, capable of voicing, nego-
tiating, and solving the grievances
and interests of their constituents.
Press Reports 
on Labor Issues 
China’s government grants some
leeway to newspapers and magazines
for investigations and exposés of
worker rights violations, especially in
foreign-owned firms. One expert
notes “a dramatic rise in outspoken
investigative reporting relating to
labor rights,” but adds the important
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The lack of basic civil and political freedoms means that the 
normal mechanisms through which civil society ameliorates 
labor abuses are absent.
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insight that journalists cannot create
news. Instead, “almost every case of
labor rights violations in China’s
private, foreign-invested . . . enter-
prises has only come to light because
migrant workers took some kind of
collective and organized action to
fight against it.” 20
This development either can lead
toward building increased support for
worker rights or can jeopardize them.
Media exposés and anecdotal
accounts of progress on the worker
rights front do not mean that civil
and political freedom, including
workers’ freedom to form organiza-
tions of their own choosing and
bargain collectively with employers, is
just over the horizon. If the govern-
ment allows the press to publish
accounts of outrageous abuses against
workers merely as a calculated “safety
valve” policy, worker discontent and
public anger can be vented without
ever bringing long-term change.
If, however, the increased reporting
represents a shift toward expanding
freedom of the press, it can become 
a powerful tool for increasing the
knowledge of Chinese workers about
violations of their rights and pin-
pointing opportunities and vehicles
for resolving them.
U.S.-China Engagement
The U.S. government has a variety of
initiatives with stated objectives
aimed at improving the human and
worker rights situation in China,
including the Congressional-Exec-
utive Commission on China (see
Chapter 3, Endnote 31) and the U.S.-
China Economic and Security
Review Commission (see Chapter 5,
Endnote 18). The U.S. government
also funds initiatives to encourage
different aspects of democratic devel-
opment and human and worker rights
through the National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED) as well as the
U.S. Departments of State and Labor.
All Labor Department programs are
official government-to-government
programs that require active cooper-
ation with the Chinese government.
The U.S. government policy
community agrees that China’s labor
practices violate international stan-
dards. The U.S. Department of
State’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices: 2003 catalogues a
myriad of ways in which China
violates core labor standards. The
CECC’s 2004 annual report reveals
that the “Chinese government has
continued its record of violating
workers’ rights and punishing
workers who advocate for change”
and that the “monopolization of
power under a one-party system and
the resulting absence of democratic
accountability have led to wide-
spread corruption and a loss of 
faith in government.” The USCC’s
2004 annual report notes that
China’s “system denies workers’
rights of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining, and it
enforces a system of work permits
that discriminates against rural
workers.” Unfortunately, inconsis-
tent application and enforcement 
of U.S. policy send mixed signals 
to both the Chinese government 
and Chinese workers.21
On March 16, 2004, for example,
the AFL-CIO and 14 affiliated
unions filed a groundbreaking peti-
tion with the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative. The petition documented
how China’s repression of worker
rights gives the country an unfair
trade advantage over the United
States and other countries, espe-
cially those in the developing
world, that have suffered invest-
ment and job losses. Filed under
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act
of 1974, the petition represented
the first use of the 301 provision to
protest a country’s labor practices.
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It called on the Bush administra-
tion to take immediate action to
impose trade remedies against
China and negotiate a binding
agreement to reduce the remedies if
China enforces worker rights. But
on April 28, barely a month later,
the Bush administration rejected
the petition as counterproductive.
U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick stated: “[W]e do not need
to conduct a year-long investigation
to know that there are serious con-
cerns with labor rights and working
conditions in China.” Zoellick also
reaffirmed the administration’s
preference for leveraging China’s
desire to be recognized as a market
economy under U.S. law to address
labor and other issues over the use
of trade sanctions applicable under
existing law.22
Some ensuing U.S. initiatives tend
to be far less direct in approach. On
June 21, 2004, during a visit to
China, U.S. Secretary of Labor
Elaine Chao signed four letters of
understanding with China. In part,
the letters pledged to share more
information on improving labor
standards related to the develop-
ment and enforcement of employ-
ment, benefit, and workplace health
and safety standards. During her
visit, Chao also reviewed an
ongoing “Rule of Law” initiative to
promote worker rights in China
through education, training, and
technical assistance.
These programs reflect the current
U.S. policy thrust toward “engage-
ment” as “the key to improving
working conditions.” Toward that
end, the U.S. government continues
to make public statements supporting
worker rights in China. U.S. Secre-
tary of Commerce Donald Evans
recently stated that “China should
allow independent trade unions to
negotiate pay settlements with their
employers, thereby allowing wages to
rise more naturally.”23
Many experts on China and labor
issues find it highly questionable that
trips, educational exchanges, and
rhetoric alone can bring about
systemic change in China. The scope
of this type of assistance is limited.
By avoiding key worker concerns, it
falls far short of what is needed to
guarantee freedom of association and
safe and healthy working conditions
for Chinese workers.
Next Steps
Chinese workers are showing great
resourcefulness and resiliency in find-
ing new tools for building worker
empowerment at the grassroots level.
But they do so within a straitjacketed
context of government control and
the pervasive threat—often carried
out—of quick and brutal repression.
Intermediate forms of worker advo-
cacy are important and worthy of
support, although not complete or
permanent solutions. The lack of
basic civil and political freedoms is a
violation of fundamental human
rights. Corporate responsibility and
international pressure by themselves
cannot guarantee basic civil and polit-
ical freedoms. The only true remedy
for the lack of civil and political
freedom is civil and political freedom.
China’s worker rights violations
point to specific problems that have
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Almost every case of worker rights violations in China’s private,
foreign-invested enterprises has only come to light because migrant
workers took some kind of collective and organized action to fight
against it.
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 6
n JUSTICE FOR ALL n CHINA
88
achievable solutions—through
compliance, in law and practice,
with ILO core labor standards. The
call to resolve these problems is
echoed by China’s international
commitments and the voices of
China’s workers. Recommended
measures are cited below.
Role of the Chinese Government
The Chinese government can adopt
the following steps to halt worker
rights violations and ensure respect
for worker rights:
n Bring the law into full compliance
with ILO core labor standards,
particularly those on freedom of
association and the right to organ-
ize and bargain collectively.
n Give workers a voice in their own
labor system. End the ACFTU
monopoly on worker representa-
tion. Give Chinese workers the
opportunity to transform the
ACFTU into a genuine workers’
organization rather than a govern-
ment-run agency, or to select
alternate representation.
n Strengthen the rule of law and
improve labor law enforcement
capacity and effectiveness on core
labor standards. To promote effec-
tive enforcement, consider im-
posing statutory fines—sufficient
to serve as deterrents—on
employers who commit repeated
or egregious labor law violations.
n Create independent labor courts
and a mediation system immune
from pressure by local government
and party officials.
n Release and compensate workers
and supporters who have been
imprisoned for worker rights
advocacy.
n End discrimination against
women workers and migrant
workers. Grant migrant workers
full protection under Chinese law
and in practice, including resi-
dency rights, so that they can
receive benefits and services and
hold local officials accountable in
places where they live and work.
n Improve enforcement of child
labor laws and immediately halt
child labor in schools.
n Stop the forced labor of political
dissidents and dismantle the
prison labor system.
n Allow the HKCTU to carry out
its responsibilities as an inde-
pendent trade union to represent
its members without interference,
consistent with ILO principles on
freedom of association, and ensure
that ILO standards on the right
to bargain collectively are incor-
porated into Hong Kong’s law.
The key to halting labor law viola-
tions is consistent enforcement.
Many labor problems in China are
similar to those experienced in other
countries that have failed to enforce
their labor laws and international
obligations. When labor standards
are not enforced at the national
level, in the courts, and all the way
down to the plant level, the stage is
set for illegal labor cost competition.
Employers who violate labor laws
have lower costs. Without effective
remedies or sanctions, the incentive
to violate labor law is strong. Em-
ployers inclined to abide by stan-
dards feel compelled to violate the
law just to stay competitive. Even if
Chinese law is brought into con-
formity with all international labor
norms, it will not be effective until
it is enforced.
These problems are exacerbated by a
lack of democracy. In the long term,
only democracy will solve them. Over
the past several decades, Chinese
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international labor norms, it will not be effective until it is enforced.
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workers have shown in many ways
that they are ready to organize if not
barred from doing so. Supporting
industrial democracy—trade union
freedom—is key to developing polit-
ical democracy in China.
Role of Multinational
Enterprises
A fundamental tension exists be-
tween China’s legal and political
denial of freedom of association to
Chinese workers and the inclusion
of freedom of association provisions
in codes of conduct adopted by mul-
tinational companies operating in
China. To strengthen the credibility
of such codes, multinational compa-
nies have a particular responsibility to
reduce this tension by actively pro-
moting greater respect for freedom of
association in both law and practice.
In the current Chinese political and
legal framework, multinational
companies with codes of conduct
that affirm freedom of association
are automatically violating these
principles if they are operating in
China. In the interest of promoting
the growth of global political sta-
bility and sustained economic devel-
opment, companies that choose to
operate in China under those condi-
tions should at least do whatever
they can to promote freedom of
association and other internationally
recognized rights of their Chinese
employees, especially the core labor
standards contained in the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work.24
Multinational companies should
publicly call on the Chinese govern-
ment to legally recognize unions as
independent organizations and to
enforce those rights. In their own
factories and other enterprises, with
or without the existence of an
ACFTU unit, companies should
permit their employees to exercise
all of their existing rights, including
the right to hold workers’ assem-
blies, elect representatives, and
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negotiate and democratically ratify
collective contracts covering wages,
hours, and working conditions, as
provided for in Article 33 of the
Trade Union Law of the PRC.
Companies should certainly not call
on government authorities to repress
workers’ attempts to exercise these
rights. Further, companies should
avoid practices that encourage
corruption, such as bribing local
officials to support the suppression
of workers.
Although the limited corporate
efforts to increase support for
freedom of association have thus far
been unsuccessful, companies should
continue and strengthen their efforts
while finding additional ways to
advance the cause of worker rights
in China. For example, they should
open their doors to Chinese and
other NGOs, including labor and
labor support organizations, so that
the working and living conditions of
their employees can be observed,
and so that workers can be educated
by outside organizations about their
rights under Chinese law and inter-
national conventions.
Companies also should provide
space in which workers can meet
and discuss their conditions, with no
interference or observation by man-
agement and no fear of retaliation.
They should encourage their em-
ployees to select representatives, and
then they should meet with those
representatives to negotiate collec-
tive contracts, as permitted by
Chinese law. Once workers have
ratified the contracts, companies
should respect and follow contract
provisions. Companies also should
encourage the local government to
register the agreements so that they
have the force of law. And of course,
companies should not resort to in-
timidation or pressure, either di-
rectly or by threatening to call in 
the authorities.
Such efforts would not be without
risk. A company threatened with
expulsion or the loss of a significant
contract will likely be reluctant to
press for change. But if companies do
not support freedom of association for
Chinese workers beyond the realm of
public relations, they are complicit in
denying Chinese workers their rights
and are choosing to profit from the
unethical exploitation of their em-
ployees. Supporting worker rights
repression in China also makes
companies contributors to political
instability and the delay of demo-
cratic development in the country.
It is unrealistic to assume that most
multinational enterprises working in
China will rapidly and voluntarily
implement these recommendations.
Those that do not, however, will be
vulnerable; the suppression of
worker rights for profit is short-
sighted. Chinese workers will
inevitably protest the unjust treat-
ment and the kinds of abuses that
are common in Chinese factories, as
workers have done before them in
China and all over the world, gener-
ating pressure from within. Labor,
labor support, and human rights
groups committed to global justice
will also press for change, exposing
companies’ unfair labor practices to
the global public. The reputation of
companies that do not respect
worker rights will be tarnished
among global consumers and civil
society. Ultimately, through
persistent and growing domestic and
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Through persistent and growing domestic and global demand from
multiple stakeholders, Chinese workers will see real advances in the
legal recognition of their rights.
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global demand from multiple stake-
holders, conditions in Chinese
factories will improve, and Chinese
workers will see real advances in the
legal recognition of their rights.
Role of Trade Union Solidarity
Through targeted, cooperative
strategies, unions and labor move-
ments throughout the world can and
must support Chinese workers’
efforts to pursue freedom of associa-
tion, the right to organize and bar-
gain collectively, and freedom from
discrimination, forced labor, and
child labor.
n The international union move-
ment must develop a coordinated
approach and action plan based
on adherence to the ILO’s Fun-
damental Principles and Rights at
Work. It must support ICFTU
efforts to encourage its affiliates
and all trade union organizations
having contacts with official organs
of the Chinese state, including the
ACFTU, to raise worker rights
concerns and report regularly to
the ICFTU about these contacts.
In addition, it must promote a
greater understanding of the
impact that worker rights viola-
tions in China have on the status
of worker rights in developing
countries. This understanding will
lead to action-oriented alliances
with worker organizations and
unions in those countries.
n Promoting the development of
indigenous labor NGOs operating
on the ground in China should
include intensifying international
trade union solidarity in support
of trade union rights in Hong
Kong; ensuring that democratic
unions in Hong Kong are in-
cluded in international meetings;
and providing technical assistance
to Hong Kong unions’ efforts to
advance democracy and respect
for worker rights.
n Strengthening the global alliance
among worker organizations, labor
NGOs, human rights groups,
international law organizations,
academics, and citizens of con-
science who seek to promote basic
worker rights in China is crucial.
To help achieve that goal, interna-
tional unions must promote infor-
mation flows and partnerships on
labor in China with universities
and academics in the United
States, inside China (including
Hong Kong), and around the
world. In addition, they should
support research and reporting to
combat the emergence of alterna-
tives to legitimate worker organi-
zations, such as the promotion of
“parallel means” of association, that
fail to meet ILO standards on
freedom of association.
n The international union move-
ment must support Global Union
Federation initiatives with indi-
vidual companies that open real
space for legitimate experiments
to promote freedom of association
in China.
n Finally, it must use every interna-
tional arena to campaign against
the suppression of core worker
rights: promoting broader and
more effective use of OECD
Multinational Guidelines to ex-
pose the widespread violation of
basic worker rights in facilities
throughout China that produce
for multinational companies;
expanding multilateral efforts to
raise the Chinese government’s
worker rights violations at the
various bodies of the ILO; sup-
porting the introduction of a 
resolution at the annual meeting
of the UN Commission for
Human Rights that describes the
Chinese government’s systematic
violation of human rights, in-
cluding core worker rights; and
intensifying international efforts
to seek the release of worker
activists in China.
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Role of U.S.-China Engagement
The CECC asks the U.S. President
and Congress to expand programs
aimed at helping workers assert their
rights under Chinese law and to
facilitate cooperation among the
private sector, the NGO sector, and
the Chinese and U.S. governments
aimed at bringing Chinese labor
standards into compliance with
international standards.25 These are
worthy considerations, and the U.S.
government should increase its
funding of programs targeted toward
improving worker rights in China.
However, attention must be given to
the effectiveness of these programs.
Efforts to focus on economic devel-
opment at the expense of democratic
development and democratic princi-
ples have backfired in many places
around the world, such as in Latin
America and Eastern Europe. The
political and economic upheavals
caused by a virtually exclusive focus
on economic development do not, as
policymakers asserted for decades,
automatically yield political stability.
Given the scale of China’s economy,
population, and influence, the failure
to steadily build political stability
through the enactment into law and
enforcement of democratic princi-
ples—such as respect for core labor
standards—could precipitate global
economic crisis.
Standing U.S. trade policy recog-
nizes the significance of worker
rights as well as commercial rights,
and it provides tools to promote
increased respect for those rights.
Accordingly, as the U.S. government
considers expanding support for
labor-related China programs, it
should also consider using the full
range of applicable provisions in
U.S. trade law and trade policy as
sources of stronger leverage in pro-
moting increased respect for worker
rights in China.
Role of Chinese Workers
Chinese workers will play the most
important role in promoting the
growth of freedom of association. As
in the past, courageous activists will
continue to encourage their govern-
ment to embrace more fully, in law
and practice, its international com-
mitments to international worker
rights. They will use their own initia-
tive to advocate publicly for their
rights and interests, and to exercise
those that already exist in Chinese
law. These include the use of clauses
that permit disciplinary measures 
or even dismissal of “trade union
personnel [who] . . . infringe upon
the rights and interests of workers.”26
One strategy that workers may wish
to adopt is to promote reform within
the ACFTU through using their
existing rights to elect officers every
three to five years, to form local
town level and sub-district level
federations, and to call an extraordi-
nary union meeting once they have
33 percent member support. On the
other hand, they may choose to
work outside the ACFTU with
nascent independent groups that
seek to secure legal enforcement of
existing norms. The most important
guiding principle is that Chinese
workers themselves must choose
who will represent them.
Chinese workers also will choose the
strategies and tactics by which they
defend and expand their rights.
Knowing full well how difficult and
dangerous this struggle will be, they
have already demonstrated their
courage and commitment in thou-
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sands of cases. In this endeavor they
will undoubtedly have the whole-
hearted support of the worker and
human rights movements through-
out the world.
The Choice to Lead
China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001. But
becoming a modern industrial power
and a leader of developing country
coalitions is not just a matter of
joining the WTO and adopting
policies of privatization, deregula-
tion, foreign investment, and other
attributes of the market-driven
model of economic development.
China’s new economic strength and
leadership carry responsibilities in
the social justice arena, too. With a
seat on the ILO’s governing body,
China must take steps to comply
with its ILO obligations on core
labor standards, not just its obliga-
tions under WTO trade rules.
China is an ancient civilization that
has contributed significantly over
many centuries to the world’s ethical
treasury—not least through the
development of Confucianism,
Taoism, and Chinese Buddhism.
In more recent times, China “stood
up” in 1949 against a century of
interference, intervention, and occu-
pation. The revolution offered a
vision of equality, justice, and an end
to exploitation and abuse against
workers and peasants, but that vision
was darkened. The recent turn to a
“robber baron” approach to industrial
development under the slogan “to
get rich is glorious” threatens to
erase it altogether.
China remains a one-party state
with a state party-controlled labor
movement. Chinese workers are
oppressed and exploited in ways that
depress conditions throughout the
world. Their condition is unaccept-
able. Yet it is clear that current insti-
tutions will not contain the powerful
forces growing within China’s new
industrial districts and that these
forces will inevitably bring great
change to Chinese society. What
will be the nature of that change,
and who will shape it? 
Today, China has a choice: to turn
its back on the future, or to stand up
again and help lead the world toward
a new vision in a common project for
sustainable economic development
with democracy, human rights, and
social justice at its core. The oppor-
tunity begins with a commitment to
increase respect for the dignity of
work and human rights in China. In
the meantime, China’s workers and
their allies can use the small existing
openings to push forward, to begin
to build organizations, to call for
improved conditions, and to advo-
cate for freedom of association. In
the interest of all workers every-
where, China’s millions of workers
must win respect for their rights.
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ACFTU All-China Federation of Trade Unions
bagong strike
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CECC U.S. Congressional-Executive Committee on China
CEDAW UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CERD UN International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
CFA ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
CRC UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
dagongmei rural migrant female workers
daigong slowdown
EPZ export processing zone; see SEZ
FLUC Free Labor Union of China
GLF “Great Leap Forward”
GUF Global Union Federation
guolaosi overwork death
HKCIC Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee
HKCTU Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions
HKTUC Hong Kong Trades Union Council
hukou household registration system instituted in 1953
ICCPR UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICO Institute of Contemporary Observation
IHLO Hong Kong ICFTU-GUF-HKCTU-HKTUC Liaison Office
ILO International Labor Organization
KMT Kuomingtang
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laogai China’s forced labor system; literally, “reform through labor”
LRF Laogai Research Foundation
mangliu term applied to peasants who moved about the country illegally looking for food or jobs; literally,
“drifting” or “wandering without direction”
MFN Most Favored Nation status (see NTR)
MOU memorandum of understanding
NGO non-governmental organization
NTR Normal Trade Relations
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRC People’s Republic of China
Rmb Renmingbi, China’s currency, also informally called the yuan; 1 Rmb = 13 cents; $1.00 = 8.3 Rmb
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
RTL Reeducation through Labor (laodong jiaoyang), part of China’s prison system 
SEZ special economic zone, similar to export processing zone
SOE state-owned enterprise
tinggong work stoppage
“transmission belt” Chinese labor relations model whereby unions convey government policies to workers and
promote labor discipline to implement those policies, as opposed to representing workers in deal-
ings with employers and the government
UNCHR United Nations Committee on Human Rights
USCC U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
WAF Workers’ Autonomous Federation
WTO World Trade Organization
yuan see Rmb
